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“[C]ourts cannot make for the parties better agreements than they themselves
have been satisfied to make.”1
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INTRODUCTION
Given the policy in favor of enforcing contracts in general2 and the specific
policy in favor of and enforcing agreements that are a part of a settlement,3 one
might expect a court to look very skeptically when a party to a personal injury
2

Courts rarely set aside contracts of any kind. See Davis v. G N Mortgage Corp., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 956 (2003) (“A bedrock principle of contract law is pacta sunt servanda,
which translates from Latin as ‘agreements must be kept.’ ”). This reticence to set aside a
contract is a result, at least in part, of the notion that enforcement of contracts honors the policy of freedom of contract that underpins our society’s system of economic ordering by protecting justified expectations, providing stability to transactions, and honoring the autonomy
of the individual to enter into the transaction of that individual’s choice. Professor John Edward Murray explained as follows: “If people cannot project their realistic needs, desires and
aspirations into the future and be assured that they will be fulfilled, their creative energies
will not be released. The social institution of contract is an indispensable condition, not only
to economic freedom, but freedom, itself.” JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS § 1, at 3 (5th ed. 2011); see also discussion infra Section VI.A.
3 In addition to the general desire to enforce contracts, courts also state that they favor and
encourage the settlement of disputes outside of courts. Courts acknowledge the need to respect settlement agreements because the finality of those agreements is a vital part of the
policy of encourage settlements. See Schmidt v. Smith, 216 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Minn. 1974)
(“To permit them [release settlements] to be vacated except for the most compelling reason
creates ‘uncertainty, chaos, and confusion’ with respect to future dispositions, and is a disservice to other litigants whose matters are thereby delayed”) (quoting Simons v. Schiek’s,
Inc., 145 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. 1966) (Otis, J., dissenting)); see also discussion infra Section VI.B.
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release asks a court to set aside the release. But many courts have reacted atypically when injured parties who have settled their claims have sought to have
those releases set aside on the basis of a lack of understanding or knowledge
about the injury.4 Absent facts supporting a claim of fraud or duress, injured
parties have turned to the mistake doctrine for relief.
Injured parties make, implicitly or explicitly, two separate claims when
urging that they should not be held to the releases they signed. First, the injured
parties—the releasors—claim that they entered into the releases suffering from
mistakes about injuries suffered.5 For example, an injured party might agree to
release the tortfeasor for injuries suffered when she knows that she has suffered
a concussion. Later, she might seek to avoid the release after she discovers that
a result of the incident is a seizure disorder and she was therefore mistaken as
to the injury.6 Second, because in the typical situation, such a party signs a
document that states that the injured party releases the other party regarding all
injuries, even those unknown,7 the injured party must also convince the court
that the written release should not be interpreted to apply to unknown injuries
or that the words of the written release should be, simply, disregarded.8
In this setting many courts have devised unique techniques to tilt the playing field in favor of the injured party. These techniques involve idiosyncratic
application of the mistake doctrine, novel attitudes toward written contract language, and even the creation of an added analysis of whether the release was
fairly and knowingly made. In using these techniques, some courts, implicitly
or explicitly, have engaged in a hindsight substantive review of the fairness of
the deal. These courts are very lenient in the analysis of what constitutes a mistake, are very lenient regarding the requirement of mutuality of the mistake, do
4

This article addresses releases that are in settlement of a claim regarding injuries already
incurred by the releasing party. It does not address exculpatory agreements, sometimes also
called releases, entered into before any injury occurs. Parties often challenge such exculpatory agreements as unenforceable because they are contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Combs
v. W. Siloam Speedway Corp., 406 P.3d 1064, 1066–67 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) (considering
exculpatory release signed before car race attendance); Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47
A.3d 1190, 1198–99, 1203 (Pa. 2012) (considering exculpatory release signed before snow
tubing).
5 See, e.g., Delpino v. Spinks, No. N13C-03-288, 2014 WL 4348236, at *1–3 (Del. Super.
Ct. Aug. 22, 2014) (involving a plaintiff who signed a release while believing injury to be a
shoulder strain but claimed mistake when he later learned injury was a labral tear requiring
surgery); Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 749–51 (Idaho 1967) (explaining plaintiff signed release believing injury to be minor but claimed mistake when he later learned the injury was a
herniated disc requiring surgery).
6 This is, in effect, what occurred in Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 380 (Colo. 1981).
7 For example, in Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002), the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed a release which related to “all injuries, known and unknown, both to
the person and the property, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an accident . . . .” (emphasis in original); see also infra Part I (for other examples of release language).
8 See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1458–60 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying
Guam law) (discussing these arguments).
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not apply the conscious ignorance concept, and do not apply the traditional respect given to written agreements—thereby neglecting to acknowledge assumptions of the risk taken by the personal injury releasor in the written agreement.
For the situation to fit into the traditional mutual mistake framework, there
must be a belief that is not in accord with the facts at the time the parties enter
into the release.9 If a court takes a broad view of the situation, it might determine that as long as the injured party knew he or she was injured at the time of
the release, then there was no mistake. Rather than take such an unforgiving
path, some courts attempt the arguably impossible task of distinguishing a laterclaimed injury as an injury unknown at the time of contracting rather than a
consequence of an injury known at the time of the signing of the release.10 The
courts then recognize the unknown injuries as legally cognizable mistakes.11
The distinctions made by some courts applying this analysis are fine, indeed.12
Other courts adopt a broader view of what might constitute a mistake. These
courts accept as sufficient a mistake about the nature or extent of the injury.13
Thus, the injury need not be unknown at the time of the release for it to be a
cognizable mistake for purposes of the mistake doctrine.14
Some courts assume the releasee shares the mistake.15 While mutual mistake doctrine requires that both parties to the release be mistaken,16 courts often
do not address the question of whether the other party to the release, the re-

9

Section 151 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: “A mistake is a belief that is
not in accord with the facts.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see also Koam Produce, Inc. v. DiMare Homestead, Inc., 329 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151). See discussion infra Section
IV.A.
10 See, e.g., LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., 496 N.E.2d 827, 830–31 (Mass. 1986) (explaining
ignorance of injury required; ignorance of consequences insufficient); see discussion infra
Section V.A.
11 See, e.g., Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391–92 (N.Y. 1969) (explaining that injured party was aware of hip pain yet court found evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment motion on the issue of whether hip injury was an unknown injury); see discussion
infra Section V.A.
12 See discussion infra Section V.A.
13 See, e.g., Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (explaining that
mistakes about the nature and extent of injuries are legally cognizable); see also discussion
infra Section V.B.
14 See, e.g., Simmons, 635 N.E.2d at 604 (explaining that mistake as to nature or extent is
accepted for purposes of the doctrine); see also discussion infra Section V.B.
15 See, e.g., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 385–86 (Colo. 1981) (describing how the
injured party survived a motion for summary judgment without a discussion of whether the
other party was mistaken); see also Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 607 (Md. 1981)
(noting that other courts find mutual mistake without a finding of “mutual misconception of
basic fact”).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see, e.g., Steiner v.
Am. Friends of Lubavitch (Chabad), 177 A.3d 1246, 1255 (D.C. 2018) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152); see also discussion infra Section IV.A.
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leasee, shared the mistake with the releasor.17 Releasees must surely claim that
they were not mistaken about the releasor’s injuries but were contracting to
avoid further litigation and added expense. Some courts recognize the doctrine
of unilateral mistake generally,18 but courts usually do not explicitly address
application of that doctrine.19
Courts also do not acknowledge the releasor’s conscious ignorance. With
either mutual or unilateral mistake doctrine, there is no mistake if the injured
party was aware or should have been aware of his or her lack of knowledge
with regard to the extent of the injuries.20 This is a barrier for the injured party
to successfully claim mistake because the injured party, as a sentient soul and
given the vagaries of the human body, should know that he or she may not
know the injuries or their consequences relating to the incident with any degree
of certainty. The injured party knows that he or she does not know. Yet, courts
rarely acknowledge this as a barrier for the injured party.21
Finally, some courts do not give respect to the language of the written release in which the releasor assumes the risk of unknown injuries and consequences. Many personal injury releases state that the release is in exchange for
the agreed compensation and that the release is for all liability for all injuries,
known and unknown, relating to the incident involving the injuries.22 By this
language the releasor assumes the risk of any injury not yet discovered at the
time of the signing of the release. Mutual and unilateral mistake doctrine provides that the doctrine is not available to one who assumes the risk of the mistake even if there is a mistake.23
Many courts attempt to minimize the effect of this release language by
wrapping the consideration of the written document into the mistake analysis.
Rather than analyzing whether the writing is reasonably susceptible to the two
interpretations urged by the parties and then considering surrounding circum17

See, e.g., Gleason, 623 P.2d at 385–86 (describing how the injured party survived a motion for summary judgment without discussion of mistake regarding the other party).
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153; see also Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d
133, 147–48 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining the doctrine of unilateral mistake is disfavored but
does exist in Massachusetts); Gamewell Mfg., Inc., v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112,
116 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a unilateral mistake as stated in § 153 is recognized as a
part of federal law).
19 But see Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 490 (Vt. 2002) (noting the injured party presents a case of unilateral mistake, not mutual mistake).
20 See, e.g., Greene, 794 F.3d at 148 (applying Mass. law) (relying in part on RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b).
21 See Christensen v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 12 F.3d 980, 989 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) to deny claim of mistake in personal injury
release setting); see also discussion infra Section IV.B.
22 See Maglin, 800 A.2d at 487. For other release examples see infra Part I.
23 See, e.g., Brandt v. MIT Dev. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323 (D. Conn. 2008) (relying
on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) to refuse to set aside settlement agreement); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a); see also discussion infra Section IV.C.
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stances to interpret the words of the writing,24 some courts seem to be swayed
by the releasor’s hindsight claim that he or she did not intend to release anything with regard to unknown injuries and do not give respect to the words used
in the release itself.25 Other courts create a separate analysis as a second stage
of the mistake analysis to determine whether the release itself was “fairly and
knowingly” made, thus focusing, at least in part, on the substantive fairness of
the deal.26
The courts who apply the traditional contract doctrines in untraditional
ways are guided by a host of motivations such as a desire to have the wrongdoer compensate the injured party in harmony with tort law theory. Some courts
are motivated by a belief that the complexity of the human body creates a situation in which people cannot possibly understand what they are doing when they
sign releases dealing with unknown injuries.27 Some courts are concerned that
the release is the product of unequal ability and bargaining strength.28 Indeed,
some courts seem motivated by compassion to protect releasors29 even when
those releasors are represented by counsel at the time they entered into the release.30
A few courts have refused to treat personal injury releases more favorably
than other contracts. These courts find no persuasive reason to tilt the playing
field to assist personal injury releasors in avoiding releases.31
Courts’ idiosyncratic treatment of personal injury releases is not new. Regardless of the validity of the underlying assumptions and presumptions that
motivated courts of the previous century,32 courts today should look with new
24

See discussion infra Section IV.C.
See, e.g., Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 750–53 (Idaho 1966); see also discussion infra
Section V.C.
26 See, e.g., Finch v. Carlton, 524 P.2d 898, 901 (Wash. 1974) (en banc); see also discussion
infra Section V.D.
27 See, e.g., Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) (“[T]he most complicated and mysterious of all the things that are upon or inhabit the earth.”); see discussion
infra Section VI.C.
28 See discussion infra Part VI.
29 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 611–12 (4th ed. 2004) (“Courts have often been
torn between sympathy for the injured party and the policy favoring compromise as a means
of settling claims, and they have been swayed by many factors, such as unfairness, that are
not germane to the issue of avoidance for mutual mistake.”). See also Bernstein v. Kapneck,
430 A.2d 602, 605 (Md. 1981) (“On the other side there are considerations, largely stemming from compassion, which importune the larger number of courts to treat seemingly unambiguous and freely entered into personal injury releases as sui generis, so as to justify
their permitting the releasor to renege on his bargain.”).
30 See, e.g., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 380, 387 (Colo. 1981) (the injured party’s
guardian was represented by counsel); see also Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1067–68
(Alaska 1978) (explaining the same).
31 See, e.g., Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 607; Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366
P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961); see also discussion infra Section V.E.
32 See Dan B. Dobbs, Conclusiveness of Personal Injury Settlements: Basic Problems, 41
N.C. L. REV. 665, 704–05 (1963); Harold C. Havighurst, Problems Concerning Settlement
25
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eyes upon the question of whether personal injury releasors should enjoy more
favorable treatment than other contracting parties. Courts should not continue
to rely on approaches first adopted many decades ago without a fresh policy
analysis.
Courts may conclude, as some courts have done in the past, that there is no
good reason to provide greater contractual protection to an injured releasor who
now claims that he or she did not know or understand the injury suffered.33
Perhaps the vagaries of bodily injuries in the twenty-first century are not so
mysterious that they cannot be contemplated and understood—at least with the
assistance of counsel. Perhaps the goal of tort law that seeks to ensure the
wrongdoer compensates the injured does not require that personal injury releases be treated more favorably than more typical agreements in the mainstream of
commerce. Perhaps contracting parties who sign releases for personal injuries
need no special protection as the result of being weaker in ability or having a
lesser bargaining position. Perhaps compassion alone cannot justify such special treatment. Such a conclusion means that claims of mistake will rarely succeed because the injured party will not have suffered a mistake at the time of
contracting and, in any event, assumed the risk of any mistake by the language
of the release and by conscious ignorance.34
A releasor’s plea is not always doomed, however. All other contract avoidance doctrines are available as they are for any contract scenario. If such a party can prove fraud or duress, for example, a court may look favorably on the
releasor’s claim that the release should be set aside.35 In addition, a releasor today has at hand the unconscionability doctrine, a doctrine that was not wellrecognized when the courts began addressing personal injury releases under the
banner of the mistake doctrine.36 In some cases a court might conclude that a
personal injury release was unconscionable at the time of formation and thus
should not be enforced.
A court, after careful policy analysis, may conclude that injured parties
should receive additional protection if they seek to avoid releases on the basis
of newly discovered or newly understood injuries. Such a conclusion does not
lead inexorably to a court blindly following past practice and attempting to
Agreements, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 307 (1958); Eugene J. Keefe, Validity of Releases Executed Under Mistake of Fact, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 135, 136 (1945).
33 See discussion infra Section V.E; see also Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 606 (“[O]ur society will
be best served by adherence to the traditional methodology . . . .”).
34 See discussion infra Sections VII.A and VII.B.
35 See, e.g., Ford v. Phillips, 994 N.Y.S.2d 688, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (“[A] motion to
dismiss a complaint based solely upon a release should be denied when the plaintiff alleges
fraud or duress in the release’s procurement.”) (citation omitted).
36 See discussion infra Section VII.C. See generally Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 149–51 (2005)
(discussing the origin and development of the doctrine); Colleen McCullough, Comment,
Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 781 (2016) (discussing the origin and development of the unconscionability doctrine).
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shove the square peg of personal injury releases into the round hole of traditional mistake and other contract doctrines. Nor should it mean that such a
court should engage in a bare analysis of the substantive fairness of the deal.
If a court concludes that personal injury releasors should be treated more
favorably than other contractors, the court should create a stand-alone process
analysis akin to that used with releases of certain federal rights. Releases of certain federal rights, such as Title VII rights, must be knowing and voluntary.37
Federal courts have delineated factors to analyze and the evidence to consider
in determining whether a release of federal rights is knowing and voluntary.38 If
an injured party knowingly and voluntarily entered into the release, no substantive fairness analysis should second guess the deal struck by the parties.39 This
approach provides added protection to the individual releasor while also honoring the basic tenets of contract law. Such an approach is forthright, and its rationale can be clear. Even so, a releasor will not often be able to shoulder the
burden of proving that the release was not made knowingly and voluntarily, especially if that party was represented by counsel at the time the injured party
signed the release.40
Ultimately, in very many situations, injured parties must be held to the release they signed because such releasor signed in exchange for prompt payment; agreed to the exchange knowing that he or she might learn later of injuries or effects not realized at the time of the deal; and signed a clear and
understandable document which placed the risk of unknown injuries and consequences on the releasor.
I.

THE SETTING: THE TYPICAL CASE

In the typical case in which this sort of claim arises, a person is injured and
then enters into an agreement relinquishing all claims relating to the incident.41
The release often states that the injured person relinquishes claims for all injuries relating to the incident whether those injuries are known or unknown.42 For
example, in Maglin v. Tschannerl, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed a release with the following language:
For the sole consideration of $500.00 . . . the undersigned hereby releases and
forever discharges [defendant] from any and all claims . . . causes of action or
suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries, known and unknown, both to the person and the property, which have re37

See discussion infra Part VIII.
See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2007).
39 See id. at 1042–43.
40 See discussion infra Part VIII.
41 See, e.g., Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002) (describing how plaintiff
thinking she suffered whiplash in an automobile collision, signed a release of “all injuries,
known and unknown” in exchange for $500 and then later discovered that her injuries were
more significant).
42 Id.
38
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sulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred on or about
the 12th day of March, 1996.43

And in Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court quoted
the release before it in part as follows:
FOR THE SOLE AND ONLY CONSIDERATION . . . to me/us paid, . . . , I/we
hereby release and discharge . . . [the tortfeasor] from all claims of any kind or
character which I/we have or may have against him or them, and especially because of all damages, losses or injury to persons or property, or both, whether
known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, resulting or to result from accident on or about September 18, 1969, . . . , and I/we hereby acknowledge full
settlement and satisfaction of all claims of whatever kind or character which
I/we may have against him or them by reason of the above mentioned damages,
losses or injuries.44

In the typical case, after the injured party has signed the release and received the money that is the consideration supporting the release, the injured
party claims that the release should be set aside because his or her injuries are
not what the party thought at the time the release was signed. Bronson v. Hansel presents a good example.45 In Bronson, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision, after which she suffered from neck pain and was treated for a

43

Id. (emphasis provided by the court).
Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (emphasis added).
A sample release presented as one used by a common insurer and found online releases parties:
44

[F]rom any and every claim, . . . in any way growing out of any and all personal injuries and
consequences thereof, including, but not limited to, . . . any injuries which may exist but which
at this time are unknown and unanticipated and which may develop at some time in the future,
all unforeseen developments arising from known injuries, . . . resulting or to result from an accident that occurred . . . .

See Release in Full of All Claims, MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files
/release-geico.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WG9-ADZU] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). Another release presented as one used by another common insurer and found online releases parties:
“[F]rom any and all actions, causes of action, claims and demands, damages, costs, loss of
services, expenses and compensation on account of or in any way arising out of any and all
known and unknown personal injuries and property damage resulting or to result from an
accident which occurred . . . .” Release and Settlement of Claim, MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https:
//www.millerandzois.com/files/release-hartford.pdf [https://perma.cc/98R5-GUZL] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). For other examples, see Full Release of all Claims with Indemnity,
MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files/release-progressive.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/9TYE-&7YHL] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); Parents/Guardian Release and Indemnity Agreement, MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files/release-usaa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VLL-D8K2] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); and Release of all Claims,
MILLER & ZOIS, LLC, https://www.millerandzois.com/files/release-zurich.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZKF4-J2XS] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). Releases that apply by their terms to known and
unknown injuries and consequences are not a new phenomenon. See Dobbs, supra note 32,
at 672 (noting that releases at that time, the early 1960s, contained such language).
45 See generally Bronson v. Hansel, 913 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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strain.46 She signed a release, entitled, “Release of All Claims,” in exchange for
approximately $1,050.47 The release stated that the plaintiff was releasing all
claims “growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforseen[,] bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences
thereof resulting from the accident” and that the plaintiff “declare(s) and represent(s) that there may be unknown or unanticipated injuries resulting from the
. . . accident . . . and[,] in making [the r]elease[,] it is understood and agreed
that [it] is intended to include such injuries.”48 Later, the injured party discovered that she suffered a herniated disc as a result of the accident.49 The plaintiff
sued, claiming that the release should not be a barrier to her action to recover
for her injuries because she had signed the release when mistaken about her injury.50
II. CONTRACT DOCTRINE APPLIES
A settlement agreement is a contract, and thus traditional contract law principles apply.51 A release is, in effect, a settlement agreement52 and so, likewise,
46

Id. at 852. Many of the cases in which the issue arise involve automobile collisions but, of
course, the issue can arise in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d
378, 379–80 (Colo. 1981) (describing how vending machine fell on the injured party).
47 Bronson, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. See Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *2 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014). In
Hicks, the plaintiff was in an automobile collision and suffered headaches and neck pain as a
result. Id. at *1. After settling her claim for $4,000, she began experiencing additional pain
which led to a diagnosis of cervical disk herniation requiring surgery. Id. The plaintiff sued,
claiming that the release should not be a bar to her recovery because at the time of the release she had been mistaken about her injury. Id. at *1–2. She had believed the injury to be a
cervical strain when in reality it was a herniated disc. Id. at *3. The release the plaintiff
signed stated in part that the plaintiff “declares and represents that the injuries are or may be
permanent and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite.” Id.; see also Delpino v.
Spinks, No. N13C-03-288, 2014 WL 4348236, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2014). The
plaintiff in Delpino was involved in an automobile collision. Id. He suffered from shoulder
pain which he believed to be a strain. Id. In exchange for $750, he signed a release provided
by the defendant’s insurer which stated:
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is in full compromise of a doubtful and disputed
claim as to both questions of liability and as to the nature and extent of the injuries . . . it is understood and agreed that the undersigned rely(ies) [sic] wholly upon the undersigned’s judgment, belief and knowledge as to the nature, extent, effect and duration of said injuries and liability therefore.

Id. Later, he discovered that he had suffered a labral tear which required shoulder surgery.
Id. at *2. The plaintiff sued and when the defendant moved for the matter to be dismissed on
the basis of the release, the plaintiff claimed that the release was the product of a mutual mistake such that it should not be enforced. Id.
51 See May v. Anderson, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005) (“Because a settlement agreement is a contract, its construction and enforcement are governed by principles of contract
law.”) (citing Reichelt v. Urban Inv. & Dev. Co., 611 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1985));
see also Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 17 CV 2343, 2018 WL 558501, at *4 (N.D.
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traditional contract law principles apply,53 including traditional contract formation54 and interpretation principles.55 Once a party proves a release has been
entered into, courts require the releasor to shoulder the burden of proving that
the release should not be honored but rather should be set aside.56
III. CONTRACT MISTAKE DOCTRINE
Injured parties throughout the years have sought to avoid releases on the
basis that the injured parties were not aware of or did not fully understand the
injuries suffered when they entered into the releases as part of settlements of
claims and in exchange for remuneration.57 Injured parties have claimed that
that the releases should not be enforced because the parties to the releases
shared a mutual mistake about the injuries.58
Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2626 (7th Cir. July 26, 2018) (“A settlement
agreement is a contract, and it is governed by principles of state contract law.”).
52 See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457, 462 (Del.
1999) (“A release is a form of contract with the consideration typically being the surrender
of a claim or cause of action in exchange for the payment of funds or surrender or an offsetting claim.”).
53 See Washington, 2018 WL 558501, at *4 (“A release within a settlement agreement is
also governed by contract law.”).
54 See Chaganti & Assocs. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1221 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
551 U.S. 1131 (2007) (“Basic principles of contract formation govern the existence and enforcement of the alleged settlement.”).
55 See Powell v. Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A settlement agreement is a
contract that is interpreted according to general principles of contract law.”).
56
See, e.g., Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1069–70 (Alaska 1978) (“Once the party relying on a release establishes that it was given with an understanding of the nature of the instrument, the burden is on the releasor to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
release should be set aside.”) (citation omitted); Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 752 (Idaho
1966) (“[T]he releasor has the burden of proving the reasons for setting aside the release by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.”).
57 For historical discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Dobbs, supra note 32. See
Joseph Conder, Comment, The Enforceability of Personal Injury Releases: Gleason v. Guzman, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (1983); Michael A. Plotz, Comment, Personal Injury
Releases May Be Set Aside Under the Doctrine of Mutual Mistake When the Injury Later
Sued for Was Unknown at the Time of Signing: Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.
1990), 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 311, 314–24 (1991); Robert A. Radcliffe, Note, When Should the
Trier of Fact Determine the Validity of Personal Injury Releases?—Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987), 63 WASH. L. REV. 749, 750–53 (1988);
For a list of cases see Michael DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Avoidance of Release of Personal Injury Claim on Ground of Mistake as to Nature and Extent of
Injuries, 13 A.L.R. 4th 686 (1982).
58
For a discussion of the contract mistake doctrine generally, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2003); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in
Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1645, 1684–86 (2003); and Val D. Ricks, American Mutual
Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration Reincarnate, 58 LA. L. REV. 663, 664–76
(1998). For general discussion about the mistake doctrine in contracts as well as the criminal
law’s mistake doctrine, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL
AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS (2004).
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Today, there are two recognized mistake doctrines that can cause a court to
refuse to enforce a contract: mutual mistake and unilateral mistake. The stated
definitions of the doctrines across jurisdictions vary.59 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, with regard to both types of mistake, defines a “mistake” as
“a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”60 A comment notes that “the erroneous belief must relate to the facts as they exist at the time of the making of
the contract” and that a “party’s prediction or judgment as to events to occur in
the future, even if erroneous,” is not a mistake.61
The Restatement provides with regard to mutual mistake that:
1. both parties must share the mistake,
2. the mistake must be “as to a basic assumption on which the contract
was made[,]”
3. the mistake must have a “material effect on the agreed exchange of
performances,” and
4. the party seeking relief must not bear the risk of the mistake.62
Unilateral mistake differs from mutual mistake in that only one party to the
contract must be mistaken. In addition, “the effect of the mistake is such that
enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable,” or that the other party
caused or had reason to know of the mistake.63
59

Some jurisdictions adopt the Restatement approach. See, e.g., Rotunda v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc., 123 A.3d 980, 984 n.4 (D.C. 2015); Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005). Other jurisdictions have their own approach. See, e.g., Anderson Cty. v. Preston, 804
S.E.2d 282, 297 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“A contract may be rescinded for mistake, if justice so
requires, in the following circumstances: (1) whe[n] the mistake is mutual and is in reference
to the facts or supposed facts upon which the contract is based; (2) whe[n] the mistake is mutual and consists in the omission or insertion of some material element affecting the subject
matter or the terms and stipulations of the contract, inconsistent with the true agreement of
the parties; (3) whe[n] the mistake is unilateral and has been induced by the fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, concealment, or imposition of the party opposed to the rescission, without
negligence on the part of the party claiming rescission; or (4) whe[n] the mistake is unilateral
and is accompanied by very strong and extraordinary circumstances which would make it a
wrong to enforce the agreement, sustained by competent evidence of the clearest kind.”)
(quoting King v. Oxford, 318 S.E.2d 125, 128 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
With regard to unilateral mistake, see Whistleblower 4496-15W v. Comm’r, No. 4496-15W,
2017 WL 2304309, at *7 (T.C. May 25, 2017) (“A party’s unilateral mistake, by contrast,
generally will not suffice to invalidate a contract unless it was induced in some way by the
other party . . .”). See Gessin Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. 95 Wall Assocs., LLC, 903 N.Y.S.2d
26, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“[A] court sitting in equity can rescind a contract for unilateral mistake if failure to rescind would unjustly enrich one party at the other’s expense, and
the parties can be returned to the status quo ante without prejudice.”) (citation omitted). But
see Vandenberg v. Brunswick Corp., 90 N.E.3d 1048, 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“A unilateral mistake is insufficient to invalidate an agreement compromising and settling a disputed
claim.”) (quoting Cole Taylor Bank v. Cole Taylor Bank, 586 N.E.2d 775, 783 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992)).
60 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
61 See id. § 151 cmt. a.
62 See id. § 152.
63 See id. § 153.
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With both mutual mistake and unilateral mistake, a party bears the risk of
the mistake and cannot use the mistake doctrine to his or her benefit in three
situations. First, a party cannot use the mistake doctrine if the parties have allocated the risk to that party by agreement; in such a situation the parties have, in
advance, confronted the possibility that there could be errors but deal with how
that should be handled by agreement.64 The agreement that a party entered into
while mistaken can, and usually does, itself allocate the risk and saves the document’s validity.65 Second, a party cannot use the mistake doctrine if that party
entered into the agreement with “conscious ignorance.”66 A party is “conscious[ly] ignorant” if the party knows he or she lacks information about the
issue to which the mistake relates but enters into the agreement anyway.67
Third, a court may place the risk on a party because “it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.”68
IV. TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE TO THE TYPICAL
PERSONAL INJURY RELEASE SITUATION
A personal injury releasor has four tremendous hurdles blocking the way to
success of a mutual mistake claim. First, the releasor must prove that the mistake at the heart of the basic assumption of the deal is about the facts as they
existed at the time the release was entered into and not simply a speculation or
prediction of the future.69 Second, the injured party must prove that the injured
party and the releasee shared a mistake about the injured party’s injuries. 70
Third, the injured party cannot have been acting in conscious ignorance, and
fourth, the agreement cannot have placed the risk on the injured party by its
own terms.71
A. A Shared Mistake of Fact and Not a Speculation or Prediction
A party seeking to avoid a personal injury release likely cannot prove that
he or she acted with “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”72 A logical
view of the situation at the time an injured party agrees to a release in exchange
for recompense is that the injured party is speculating that his or her injuries
will not become something other than what the injured party knows at the time
of the signing of the release. An injured party weighs what he knows of his injuries, the amount of money being offered, and the value to that party of having
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

See id. § 154(a), cmt. b.
See, e.g., Lenawee Cty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Mich. 1982).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmt. c.
See id. § 154(b).
See id. § 154(c).
See id. § 151 cmt. a.
See id. § 152 cmt. a.
See id. § 154(a), (b), cmt. c.
See id. § 151; see also discussion supra Part III.

19 NEV. L.J. 535, GIESEL

548

4/25/2019 8:36 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

that money immediately without the hassle of further haggling, lawsuits, and
such.
Even if an injured party can prove that her or she was mistaken, in the vast
majority of situations that party cannot prove that the other party to the release
shares the mistake. The releasee, too, is speculating. The releasee hopes that the
injuries and their consequences do not change but seeks to settle the matter so
that there is certainty and closure short of extended litigation.73
Often the injured party has legal counsel.74 The basic professional obligation of competence requires such counsel to bring home to the injured party the
possibility of later discovered physical effects of the precipitating event.75 If an
injured party with the benefit of the advice of counsel enters into a release as
part of the settlement of a matter, a successful claim of mutual mistake is hard
to fathom.
B. The Injured Party Has the Risk of Mistake by Conscious Ignorance
In the vast majority of these situations the injured party cannot survive the
conscious ignorance analysis. This is especially true when the injured party has
the benefit of the advice of an attorney at the time of the signing of the release.
In Wood v. Boynton, a classic conscious ignorance case, a woman brought a
stone to a shop to sell because she needed money.76 Neither she nor the shopkeeper knew what the stone was, but both thought it was a topaz.77 The shopkeeper bought the stone for a dollar.78 Later, the parties discovered that the
stone was a diamond.79 The seller of the stone claimed mistake and asked the
court to set aside the contract of sale.80 The court refused, noting that the seller
chose to sell without further investigation of its composition.81 The seller sold
knowing she did not know with certainty the composition of the stone.82
In the release setting, to avoid the conscious ignorance bar, injured parties
must claim that they did not perceive the uncertainty of their medical condition.
Given the society in which injured parties live—a society which bombards
73

See, e.g., Boccarossa v. Watkins, 313 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I. 1973) (describing how releasee
did not share the mistake); Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 490 (Vt. 2002) (explaining
that at most the injured party has proved unilateral mistake).
74 See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988).
75 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
76 Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 43 (Wis. 1885).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 44.
81 Id. (“If she chose to sell it without further investigation as to its intrinsic value . . . she
cannot repudiate the sale because it is afterwards ascertained that she made a bad bargain.”).
82 Id.
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people with information of all sorts, including medical knowledge—this claim
seems far-fetched. As one court has noted: “There was, of course, at the time of
settlement negotiations, as in every personal injury case, a conscious uncertainty regarding the medical outcome of the victim’s case. At the time of settlement, both parties undertook a risk that the resolution of the uncertainty might
be unfavorable.”83
In addition, many injured parties enter releases in exchange for compensation only after consulting an attorney.84 Such an attorney, if competent, surely
explained to the injured party the possibility that not all injuries or effects of
injuries had manifested at the time the injured party considered the release.85
Thus, the attorney made the injured party aware of his or her ignorance about
injuries. The involvement of an attorney makes an injured party’s claim of lack
of conscious ignorance particularly suspect. A rational explanation for the situation is that the injured party, after consultation with counsel, understood that
further injury or complications could occur and yet that party preferred the certainty of the payment in the short term rather than the chance of a payment in
the long term after costly litigation.86
C. The Release Places the Risk of Mistake on the Injured Party
In many situations mistake doctrine should not be available to the personal
injury releasor, regardless of the releasor’s knowledge of injury, because the
release placed the risk of any mistake regarding injuries on the releasor. When
a contract allocates the risk of a particular type of mistake to a party, that party
cannot rely on such a mistake to avoid the contract.87 A common scenario in
which this issue arises is when a purchaser of land seeks to have the contract
for sale set aside on the basis of a mistake about the possible uses of the land.88
Often such contracts provide that the purchaser is buying the property “as is.”89
Courts find that purchasers cannot rely on a mistake as to possible land use be83

Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1454–55 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that an attorney was consulted before the release was signed); Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d
378, 380 (Colo. 1981) (also explaining an attorney was consulted before the release was
signed).
85 This explanation would be required by the duty of competence all attorneys owe to their
clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
86 See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 45 F.3d 499, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding party cannot
claim mistake because party knew the matter had been appealed and a decision could be rendered at any time; settlement was made in conscious ignorance).
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also discussion supra Part III.
88 See, e.g., Lenawee Cty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 205, 210 (Mich.
1982).
89 See, e.g., id. at 210.
84
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cause the “as is” language of the contracts placed the risk of the mistake on the
purchasers.90
Typical personal injury releases refer expressly to the possibility of unknown injuries or effects on the releasor.91 The court in Ranta v. Rake reviewed
a particularly explicit release which referred to “all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the
consequences thereof,” and then continued:
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful
and disputed claim, and that the payment made is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby released, and that
said releasees deny liability therefor and intend merely to avoid litigation and
buy their peace.
The undersigned hereby declare(s) and represent(s) that the injuries sustained
are or may be permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making this Release it is understood and agreed, that
the undersigned rely(ies) wholly upon the undersigned’s judgment, belief and
knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability
therefor and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of
the party or parties hereby released or their representatives or by any physician
or surgeon by them employed.
....
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND
FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.92

Regardless of whether the document states that the party has read it, a party
who signs a document is held to have read it.93 As the Supreme Court stated
long ago in Upton v. Tribilcock, “It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not
read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.”94
The language of this Ranta release or any other typical release is such that
the result of any interpretation analysis must conclude that the release clearly
places the risk of unknown injuries on the injured party. In modern contract
law, a court determines a party’s assent to an agreement by looking at the external or objective manifestations of intentions.95 The focus is on what the other
90

See, e.g., id.; Atkins v. Kirkpatrick, 823 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
See supra Part I for examples of releases.
92 Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 749 (Idaho 1966).
93 See Giaccone v. Canopius U.S. Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d 668, 674 (D.N.J. 2015) (applying N.J. law) (“Indeed, signing a contract creates a conclusive presumption that the signer
read, understood, and assented to its terms.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Anzueto v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 357 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (D.D.C.
2004) (“[I]t is well established that a person has a duty to read a contract before he signs it. If
he had the opportunity to read it, he is bound by its terms regardless of whether he thought
he was signing an actual contract.”) (citation omitted).
94 Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875).
95 See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954); see also MURRAY, supra note
2, § 31, at 62.
91
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party would reasonably believe as a result of the party’s manifestations of assent.96 The objective approach means that when a court evaluates what the parties intended by the words used in the document they signed, the court should
focus on how each party’s words and actions would be reasonably perceived by
the other party.97
A court entertaining a releasor’s plea to not enforce a release of “all injuries, known and unknown,”98 acts with this objective view as background. Even
assuming the parol evidence rule is not an obstacle to the admission of evidence relating to the deal struck,99 and with the court considering all evidence
proffered by the releasor, the releasor has a difficult path to success in arguing
that the words of the release should be interpreted to not place the risk of any
mistake as to injuries squarely on the releasor.100
When parties seek to have courts interpret the meaning of agreements,
courts look to the writing and, often, to extrinsic evidence101 to interpret the
writing and to determine whether the writing is reasonably susceptible to the
meanings suggested by the parties.102 Some courts give the writing more weight
96

See FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 3.6, at 115 (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the
objective theory had become ascendant and courts universally accept it today.”); see also
Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 147 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying Mass. law) (“Although mutual
assent is often misleadingly referred to as a ‘meeting of the minds,’ the formation of a valid
contract under Massachusetts law requires objective, not subjective, intent.”) (citation omitted).
97 See Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987) (“ ‘[I]ntent’ does
not invite a tour through [the plaintiff’s] cranium, with [the plaintiff] as the guide.”); see also
Westlake Invs., LLC v. MLP Mgmt., LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (S.D. Iowa 2012)
(“Mutual assent is determined from objective evidence. When interpreting a settlement
agreement the primary concern is to determine the intention of the parties; ‘[e]vidence of the
parties’ mutual intent is what matters.’ ”) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Peak v. Adams,
799 N.W.2d 535, 544 (Iowa 2011)).
98 Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002).
99 See Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 607 (Md. 1981) (“[P]arole [sic] evidence ordinarily is inadmissible to vary, alter or contradict a contract, including a release, that is complete and unambiguous, in the absence of ‘fraud, accident or mutual mistake.’ ”) (quoting
McLain v. Pernell, 258 A.2d 416, 418 (Md. 1969)); see generally Juanda Lowder Daniel,
K.I.S.S. the Parol Evidence Rule Goodbye: Simplifying the Concept of Protecting the Parties’ Written Agreement, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 248 (2007) (discussing the rule and its
exceptions). For a general discussion of the parol evidence rule, see MURRAY, supra note 2,
§§ 83, 86, at 416, 442.
100 Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., Inc., 239 F. 976, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
(“[T]here is a critical breaking point . . . beyond which no language can be forced[.]”).
101 See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“External indicia of the parties’ intent other than written words are useful, and probably indispensable, in interpreting contract terms. If each judge simply applied his own linguistic
background and experience to the words of a contract, contracting parties would live in a
most uncertain environment.”); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940–42 (1967) (describing how context gives words meaning).
102 See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A., 619 F.2d at 1011 (“If a reasonable alternative interpretation
is suggested, even though it may be alien to the judge’s linguistic experience, objective evidence in support of that interpretation should be considered by the fact finder.”) (citation
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and require a finding of ambiguity within the document itself before considering evidence other than the writing.103
A typical generic contract interpretation approach is presented in Engineered Abrasives, Inc. v. American Machine Products and Service, Inc.104 In
that case, the parties settled a matter in a commercial setting that included a release provision in which Engineered Abrasives agreed as follows:
[Engineered Abrasives] . . . hereby releases [American] . . . from any . . . claims,
. . . liabilities, obligations, damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, expenses, actions,
and/or causes of action of every nature, . . . whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which it ever had, now has, or may hereafter claim to
have by reason of any matter, . . . whatsoever arising or occurring prior to and
including the date of the Agreement, including but not limited to the claims and
defenses set forth in the Action.105

As part of this settlement and in exchange for the release, Engineered
Abrasives was to receive $75,000, an injunction against slander by American
Machine, and a $250,000 liquidated damages provision supporting the injunction.106 After the settlement, American Machine introduced the release in a separate trade secret matter in which Engineered Abrasives had obtained a
$714,814 default judgment against American Machine, claiming that the release applied to this earlier matter.107
Engineered Abrasives claimed that the release did not apply to the trade secret matter, noting that the parties, in developing the settlement that included
the release, did not discuss or refer to the trade secret matter and that the compensation given in exchange for the release was only approximately one-tenth
omitted); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O’Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 n.1 (Alaska
1982) (rejecting approach that requires finding of ambiguity before extrinsic evidence can be
considered to interpret).
103 For example, in Fackler v. Powell, 891 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), the court stated:
If the contract language is unambiguous and the intent of the parties is discernible from the written contract, the court is to give effect to the terms of the contract. A contract is ambiguous if a
reasonable person would find the contract subject to more than one interpretation; however, the
terms of a contract are not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to their interpretation. When the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the terms are conclusive and we do
not construe the contract or look to extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual provisions.

Id. at 1096 (internal citations omitted); see also Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 17
CV 2343, 2018 WL 558501, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2626
(7th Cir. July 26, 2018) (noting that the meaning of the document and the intention of the
parties is gathered from the document alone); Bolling Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y,
Inc., 475 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C. 1984) (“If the release is facially unambiguous, we must rely
solely upon its language as providing the best objective manifestation of the parties’ intent.”).
104 Engineered Abrasives, Inc. v. Am. Mach. Prods. & Serv., Inc., 882 F.3d 650, 653 (7th
Cir. 2018).
105 Id. at 651–52.
106 Id. at 651.
107 Id. American Machine did so via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Id. at 652.
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of the amount of the default judgment.108 The court, applying Illinois law, affirmed the lower court’s finding that the release unambiguously applied to the
trade secret matter.109 Because the writing was unambiguous, the court refused
to consider evidence extrinsic to the writing, stating that “[c]ourts look to the
language of the settlement agreement to determine the parties’ intent unless the
agreement is ambiguous.”110 The court noted the significant discrepancy between the $75,000 settlement amount and the $714,814 default judgment, but
stated that, because the document was not ambiguous, the parties’ reasoning in
settling for so little was “outside the scope of a court’s inquiry.”111
If a court applies traditional contract principles to the situation of personal
injury releases, it is likely the court will determine that the releasor, by signing
the release, agrees to release the other party regarding all injuries, even those
unknown at the time of the signing of the release. The injured party takes on the
risk of unknown injury in exchange for compensation and the extinguishment
of the risk of receiving no compensation or less compensation later.112
The language of the typical personal injury release is not unduly complex,
nor is the entire transaction itself complex.113 The release document is typically
not lengthy—only a page or two pages.114 While the releasee often controls
language of the release, the releasor commonly negotiates the compensation
with the releasee or the releasee’s representative.115 The injured party presents
evidence of the injury that he or she claims resulted from the actions of the other party and the releasor and releasee or the releasee’s agent negotiate an ap108

Id. at 652.
Id. at 654–55.
110 Id. at 653.
111 Id. at 654–55. Note that Illinois courts treat personal injury releases very differently. See
discussion infra Section V.B. For another example of a typical approach, see Goldberg v.
Goldberg, 428 A.2d 469, 474–75 (Md. 1981) (“[W]here a contract is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and it must be presumed that the parties meant what
they expressed.”) (quoting Kasten Constr., v. Rod Enters., Inc., 301 A.2d 12, 18 (Md.
1973)).
112 See Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *2 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014) (“A
release is a device by which parties seek to control the risk of the potential outcomes of litigation. Releases are executed to resolve the claims the parties know about as well as those
that are unknown or uncertain. Because litigation is inherently risky, a general release avoids
the uncertainty, expenses, and delay of a potential trial.”).
113 See the following sample releases: Full Release of All Claims with Indemnity, supra note
44; Parents/Guardian Release and Indemnity Agreement, supra note 44; Release and Settlement of Claim, supra note 44; Release in Full of All Claims, supra note 44; and Release of
All Claims, supra note 44.
114 All of the sample releases referenced in supra note 113 are one page with the exception
of one which is two pages.
115 See, e.g., Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (explaining the releasee initially offered Hicks
$2000; Hicks countered with $7000; the releasee then offered $2500; Hicks countered with
$5000; the releasee then offered $3000; Hicks reiterated a demand of $5000; the releasee
then offered $4000 which Hicks accepted); Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Alaska
1978) (noting release was signed five months after automobile collision and after negotiation
of amount).
109
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propriate amount without undue haste.116 The releasor then, often after consultation with an attorney, signs the release.117 The releasor seeks money in the
short term without further expense or delay while the releasee seeks to end the
matter efficiently.118 In this situation, it is a difficult argument to assert that the
proper interpretation of the words of the writing is that the risk of unknown injury is not given to the releasor.119
D. Traditional Application of the Unilateral Mistake Doctrine to the Typical
Personal Injury Release Situation
An injured party claiming unilateral mistake avoids the hurdle of proving
that the mistake is shared, but encounters the similarly difficult hurdle of proving “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”120 Likewise, an injured party
claiming unilateral mistake would likely bear the risk of the mistake as the result of being consciously ignorant.121 As is true with a claim of mutual mistake,
it is also very likely that the release puts the risk of the mistake on the injured
party and thus renders the party unable to use the unilateral mistake doctrine.122
In addition, the unilateral mistake doctrine, at least under the Restatement
formulation, adds to the injured party’s burden by requiring that the mistake be
caused by the other party, or that the other party have reason to know of the injured party’s mistake or that enforcement of the release would be unconscionable.123 Unlike the stand-alone unconscionability doctrine which focuses on un-

116

In Hicks, the automobile collision occurred in March and the release of the adverse party’s liability was signed in October. Hicks was treated by a physician and presented her injuries to the representative of the releasee. The releasee initially offered Hicks $2000. Hicks
countered with $7000. The releasee then offered $2500. Hicks countered with $5000. The
releasee then offered $3000. Hicks reiterated a demand of $5000. The releasee then offered
$4000 which Hicks accepted. Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1; see also Witt, 579 P.2d at
1066–67 (release signed five months after automobile collision and after negotiation; information about injury gained from treating physicians).
117 See, e.g., Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (explaining Hicks consulted two attorneys who
advised to wait at least a year); Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(noting attorney negotiated on plaintiff’s behalf).
118 See generally Dobbs, supra note 32, at 665–66 (discussing the benefits of settlement in
general).
119 Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 623 (1944) (“The more
bizarre and unusual an asserted interpretation is, the more convincing must be the testimony
that supports it. At what point the court should cease listening to testimony that white is
black and that a dollar is fifty cents is a matter for sound judicial discretion and common
sense.”).
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151, 153 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
see also discussion supra Part III and Section IV.A.
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b); see also discussion supra Part III
and Section IV.B.
122 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a); see also discussion supra Part III
and Section IV.C.
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153; see also discussion supra Part III.
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conscionability at the time of the formation of the release,124 the focus of the
unilateral mistake doctrine unconscionability analysis is the possible unconscionable effect of enforcing the document.125 Injured parties, assuming they
could prove mistake, might make a colorable claim that the effect of the release
is unconscionable by presenting evidence that the injured party gave the release
in exchange for a very small compensation in light of the ultimately discovered
injuries of the releasor.126
E. Conclusions about Traditional Application of the Mistake Doctrine
If a court applies traditional contract doctrine, an injured party cannot often
succeed in having a release rescinded. For both doctrines, the situation does not
present a recognizable mistake, but instead presents a mistake in prediction or
speculation. For mutual mistake, there is the added problem of the mistake not
being shared. And with regard to both doctrines, the releasor has the risk of unknown injury as a result of conscious ignorance and the language of the release
itself. That language is usually clear and does not lend itself to an interpretation
other than that the injured party releasor takes the risk that there are injuries or
consequences that the releasor does not fully perceive or understand.
V. COURTS’ TREATMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY RELEASES
Courts struggle with applying mistake doctrine to personal injury releases
in the situation of later claimed injuries. Courts have a difficult time determining whether the injured party was mistaken about a fact at the time of contracting or, rather, simply speculating about the future, consciously ignorant of the
true physical state of his or her body.127 Not only is the existence of a mistake a
sticky wicket, the issue of the mutuality of the mistake is one not often addressed by the courts, although it is a requirement of the mutual mistake doctrine.128 Courts also struggle with the language of the release in terms of mistake doctrine and traditional written contract treatment.129
124

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208; see also discussion infra Section
VII.C.
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (“the effect of the mistake is such that
enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable”).
126 See, e.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 216 N.W.2d 669, 670–71 (Minn. 1974) (explaining the injured party settled for $2,100 but later sued for $95,000 claiming that she released the releasee when she thought she suffered from muscular strain but later had disc removal and
spinal fusion surgery as a result of cervical disc syndrome); see also LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce
Co., 496 N.E.2d 827, 829 (Mass. 1986) (describing that in a matter arising from a workplace
injury, the injured party signed a release in exchange for $4,000 thinking he had a toe injury;
he sued to set aside the release after he had both legs amputated above the knee as a consequence of the accident).
127 See discussion supra Sections IV.A, IV.B; see also infra Sections V.A, V.B.
128 See, e.g., Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 753 (Idaho 1966) (explaining that the lower court
dismissed but the appellate court reversed on the basis of the releasor’s intent only). Occasionally, courts do address whether the other party to the release was mistaken. See, e.g.,
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A. Mistake Doctrine Applies with an Unknown Injury But Not with an
Unknown Consequence of a Known Injury
Because mistake doctrine requires that the mistake be one of fact existing
at the time of the signing of the release, some courts state that the mistake doctrine can apply to a situation in which the injured party is not aware of the injury at the time of the release.130 If, however, the injured party is aware of the injury but not its consequences, there is no mistake because the injury existed and
was known at the time of the release.131 The contract mistake doctrine can apply to a mistake of diagnosis but not one of prognosis.132
For example, in Mangini v. McClurg the injured party, resisting enforcement of the release she had executed, claimed that at the time of the signing of
the release her hip injury was unknown.133 No doctor had identified the hip injury, though she was experiencing pain in the hip.134 Examining physicians believed the hip pain to be related to a back strain and a hematoma with no lasting
consequences.135 The New York court stated the test as follows:
A mistaken belief as to the nonexistence of presently existing injury is a prerequisite to avoidance of a release . . . . If the injury is known, and the mistake, it
has been said, is merely as to the consequence, future course, or sequelae of a
known injury, then the release will stand.136

In effect, with this analysis, if a releasor knows of an injury and releases
the other party, the releasor has assumed the risk of further consequences of
that injury. No claim of mistake is therefore possible.137
Boccarossa v. Watkins, 313 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I. 1973) (finding releasee did not share the
mistake); Beaver v. Estate of Harris, 409 P.2d 143, 148 (Wash. 1965) (determining releasee
did not share the mistake).
129 See discussion supra Section IV.C and infra Sections V.C., V.D.
130 See, e.g., Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391 (N.Y. 1969).
131 Id.
132 The court in La Fleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., 496 N.E.2d 827 (Mass. 1986), noted:
[T]he great weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports the view that a release of claims
for personal injuries may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake if the parties at the time of
signing the agreement were mistaken as to the existence of an injury, as opposed to the unknown
consequences of known injuries.

Id. at 831. The LaFleur court adopted that approach in finding that there was evidence that
the injured party had an unknown injury since the earlier diagnosis was a toe injury and the
later issue was a circulatory problem resulting in leg amputation. Id. at 832; see also Oliver
v. Clark, 537 N.W.2d 635, 640–41 (Neb. 1995) (“Oliver, to avoid the release in this case,
must demonstrate that his present condition is not the result of the development of an injury
known at the execution of the release, but is an injury that was wholly unknown at the release’s signing.”); Nevue v. Close, 867 P.2d 635, 636–37 (Wash. 1994) (applying this approach).
133 Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 388.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 389.
136 Id. at 391.
137 See, e.g., Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *3 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014)
(“Hicks assumed the risk of mistake when she signed the Release without obtaining a more
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The Mangini court, in reviewing the matter before it, opined that the injured party had put forth sufficient evidence to survive the other party’s motion
for summary judgment on the issue of mistake.138 Though the injured party was
aware of pain in her hip area, no hip injury had been contemplated at the time
of the signing of the release.139 Thus, the hip injury was unknown at the signing
of the release.140
As the facts of this case illustrate, this analysis requires courts to delve into
the high weeds of the injuries. The Mangini court acknowledged the difficulty
of applying the test stating, “The distinction, a well-established one, is more
easily expressed than applied in practice, and as a result the cases, it will be
seen, do not classify perfectly.”141 Indeed, such an analysis seems ill-suited for
judges who are trained in the art of words, not medicine. It leads to bizarre situations in which courts must decide issues such as whether a completely severed
nerve is a new and different injury than a partially severed nerve when the
nerve being considered is the same,142 or whether an injured party’s knowledge
of a neck injury means that the herniated disc diagnosis later revealed to the injured party is not a new, previously unknown injury.143 Addressing the difficulty of the test, the Michigan Supreme Court in Denton v. Utley stated: “Yet we
may well ask, as a practical matter (as distinguished from a verbal technique) is
it possible to completely divorce diagnosis from prognosis? Is there not an interrelation, even if not an interdependence?”144
thorough medical examination to fully discover the extent of her injuries related to her neck
pain.”).
138 Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 393.
139 See id. at 391.
140 Id. The court then determined that the injured party had also presented evidence to survive the other party’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the injured party had taken the risk of injuries unknown at the time of the signing of the release. See id. at
393.
141 Id. at 391.
142 In Gibli v. Kadosh, 717 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), the injury was diagnosed as an injury to an intact nerve but was eventually discovered to be a permanent injury,
a completely severed nerve. Reversing a grant of summary judgment for the releasee, the
court stated that “[t]he nature of the presumed injury is so different from that of the actual
injury, it is not merely a matter of degree or severity (greater pain or for a longer period).
Although the parties knew the location of the damage, they misunderstood the nature of the
damage.” Id.
143 In Bronson v. Hansel, 913 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), the injured party
knew she had a neck injury but did not know that the injury was a herniated disc. The court
refused to find that the herniated disc was “ ‘as a practical or medical matter, . . . distinguishable from unanticipated consequences of [the] known injury.’ ” Id. (quoting Mangini, 249
N.E.2d at 393). See also Cardovez v. High-Rise Installation, Inc., 46 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010), in which the injured party knew he had a head injury at the time of the
signing of the release but claimed that he did not know of a later discovered carotid cavernous fistula. The court determined that the fistula was an unknown manifestation of a known
injury and therefore not a recognizable for relief. Id. at 1123.
144 Denton v. Utley, 86 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Mich. 1957); see also Tulsa City Lines, Inc. v.
Mains, 107 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1939) (“In cases of this kind it is sometimes difficult, if
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Note that once a court using this analysis decides that there is or may be a
recognizable mistake, the court must then face the issue of the value to bestow
on the release that may allocate the risk of that unknown injury.145
B. Mistake about the Nature or Extent of the Injury Coupled with an
Unconscionable Result
In contrast, Illinois courts recognize a mistake for purposes of the mistake
doctrine even if the claimed mistake relates to the extent of a known injury.146
These courts, acknowledging that the approach applies only to releases dealing
with personal injuries,147 also require the party seeking to have the release set
aside to prove that the effect of enforcement of the release would be unconscionable given the facts eventually known about the injury.148
not impossible, to draw a distinct line of separation between mistakes relating to present and
future facts.”). In Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 379–80 (Colo. 1981), the court, in ruling that summary judgment was inappropriate where the injured party suffered a head injury
known at the time of the release but later suffered a seizure disorder, stated:
Admittedly, line-drawing here is difficult and its direction may well vary with the thrust of evidence. These basic components of knowledge, however, relate primarily to a comprehension of
the basic character of the injury as distinct from a prediction or opinion about the future course
of recovery when its basic nature is otherwise known.

Id. at 385. In Coomer v. Phelps, 172 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Ky. 2005), the court rejected the distinction between injury and consequence for purposes of mistake doctrine. The court stated
that the distinction was a “distinction without a difference.” Id.
145 The injured party must prove a legally cognizable mistake and must also prove that the
risk of that mistake does not lie with the injured party. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 152, 154 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also discussion supra Part IV.
146 See, e.g., Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A unilateral or
self-induced mistake as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries is insufficient to
void a clear and unambiguous release, and the mistake of fact must be mutual, material to the
transaction, and affect its substance”) (citation omitted); Newborn v. Hood, 408 N.E.2d 474,
476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“Numerous cases have considered the extent and nature of the injury as eventually manifested in determining conscionability and mutual mistake”) (citation
omitted). Courts of other jurisdictions may use a similar standard. See, e.g., Taylor v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-A-01-9210-CV00420, 1994 WL 24311, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26,
1994) (“Accordingly, both the Supreme Court and this court have declined to enforce general releases of insurance claims when the parties have been mutually mistaken concerning
the nature or seriousness of the claimant’s injuries.”).
147 See, e.g., Simmons, 635 N.E.2d at 604 (“[C]ases which have determined the validity of
releases based on a mistake of fact with respect to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries have been treated sui generis, and the rules governing releases from liability for nonpersonal injury torts or breaches of contracts do not apply.”).
148 In Newborn, the court stated:
The modern trend is to set aside releases of personal injury claims in situations where the facts,
when finally known, present an unconscionable result because of the equitable principle of doing
justice under the circumstances of each case. . . . Thus, it is clear that all the facts, including
those which become known after the release has been executed, must be considered in determining whether there was a mutual mistake of fact and whether or not the settlement is unconscionable.

Newborn, 408 N.E.2d at 476 (quoting Scherer v. Ravenswood Hosp. Med. Ctr., 388 N.E.2d
1268, 1271 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979)).
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In Simmons v. Blauw, the injured party claimed that when she signed the
release in exchange for compensation of $5,082, she thought that she had suffered a muscular strain in her back as a result of an automobile collision.149 She
later discovered that she had suffered a herniated disc requiring surgery costing
$15,000 and was not able to work.150 The injured party, with the benefit of advice of counsel, had released the releasee from all claims for “all injuries,
known and unknown, . . . which [had] resulted or may in the future develop
from [the] accident.”151 The court stated that in determining whether the releasor had a cognizable mistake, the court should consider the following:
“[W]hether (1) the parties believed the plaintiff had recovered at the time of the
release, (2) the condition was one which ordinary x-rays and customary examination did not reveal, and (3) the evidence justified the conclusion that the
plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in ascertaining the extent of injury.”152
The court concluded that the evidence showed only that the releasor, not
the released party, may have labored under a mistake.153 In addition, the court
concluded that the effect of enforcing the release was not unconscionable.154
In contrast, the court reached the opposite result in Newborn v. Hood.155 In
Newborn, the injured party was treated for injuries resulting from an automobile collision.156 After signing the release with the benefit of advice of counsel,
in exchange for compensation, the releasor suffered congestive heart failure related to the accident and incurred expenses exceeding the settlement amount.157
The court found mutual mistake and, focusing on the monetary effect alone, determined that enforcing the release would have an unconscionable result.158
C. Special Scrutiny of the Written Release as Part of the Mistake Analysis
Some courts begin the discussion with the mistake doctrine but detour to an
analysis of what the injured party intended to release. For example, in Witt v.
This unconscionability analysis is in contrast to the analysis under unconscionability doctrine itself. That doctrine requires that the determination of unconscionability occur at the
time the contract is formed. See discussion infra Section VII.C. Some courts accept claims of
mistake relating to the nature or extent of the injury and do not couple the analysis with an
inquiry into the unconscionability of the result. See, e.g., Taylor, 1994 WL 24311, at *3.
149 Simmons, 635 N.E.2d at 602.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 604.
152 Id.
153 Id. (“Aside from conclusory assertions in the affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney, there is no
evidence that defendant or the representative of his insurer believed that plaintiff would not
suffer further injuries as a result of the accident.”).
154 Id. at 605 (“[T]he amount of the settlement was not unconscionable.”).
155 Newborn v. Hood, 408 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
156 Id. at 475.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 476 (“[T]here was a mutual mistake . . . . there is a disparity of over $7,000 . . . a
settlement . . . would be unconscionable.”).
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Watkins, the Alaska Supreme Court shifted its focus away from determining
whether there might be a mutual mistake or a disfavored unilateral mistake,159
and away from any analysis involving a discernment of mistake as to injury as
opposed to mistake as to unknown effect of known injury.160 The court stated:
Niceties of distinction between the extent of a known injury or a difference in
the character of the injury should not be determinative. In either event, the decision as to whether the release is enforceable should hinge on whether the releasor, at the time of signing the release, intended to discharge the disability
which was subsequently discovered.161

The court then directed consideration of factors such as:
1. “the manner in which the release was obtained—including whether it
was hastily secured at the instigation of the releasee;”
2. “whether the releasor was at a disadvantage because of the nature of his
injuries;”
3. “whether the releasor was represented by counsel;”
4. “whether [the releasor] relied on representations of the releasee or a physician retained by the releasee”;
5. “whether liability was seriously in dispute”;
6. “[t]he relative bargaining positions of the parties”; and
7. “the amount to be paid . . . .”162
In Witt, the releasor initially was treated for bruised ribs as a result of an
automobile collision.163 He continued to have pain in his back, which was diagnosed as related to a bladder problem probably unrelated to the accident.164 After settling the matter for $3,000 with the benefit of counsel, the releasor discovered he had suffered two broken vertebrae, probably as a result of the
accident.165 In refusing to grant summary judgment for the releasee, the court
noted that there was no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the releasee, that
159

Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Alaska 1978) (“[T]he preservation of agreements
entered into in good faith and the encouragement of settlement of disputes” are interests that
“may still be preserved without adhering to rigid formulas dependent upon whether mistakes
are unilateral or mutual.”).
160 Id. at 1069 (“[W]e deliberately have not preserved the additional artificial distinction between cases involving a known injury which proves to be much more serious than believed,
and an injury different in type from that originally known.”).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1070. In Casey v. Proctor, 378 P.2d 579, 588–89 (Cal. 1963) (en banc), the court
noted the following factors to consider when deciding whether a release was knowingly
made and bars an action for later discovered personal injuries: (1) “the amount of consideration received compared with the risk of the existence of unknown injuries”; (2) “the presence
of bargaining and negotiation leading to the settlement”; (3) “the closeness of the issue of
liability”; (4) “whether the subject of personal injuries was discussed”; and (5) “the reasonableness of the contention that the injuries were in fact unknown at the time the release was
executed.”
163 Witt, 579 P.2d at 1066.
164 Id. at 1067.
165 Id.
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the releasor had enjoyed the assistance of counsel, and that the release was not
the product of haste and was not induced by the releasee or his agents.166 Yet,
the court concluded that because the releasor had no knowledge at the time of
entering into the release that he suffered from two broken vertebrae, “A question is presented as to whether the fractured vertebrae caused any increased disability, and particularly, as to whether such disability, if any, was of a type substantially different from the possibilities of disability considered by Witt at the
time he signed the release.”167
This approach deviates significantly from traditional mistake doctrine and
traditional views of the value of a written agreement.168 The court appears to be
applying an analysis of the injured party’s subjective intent without giving
much if any weight to the release itself. The analysis seems unmoored from the
language of the document entirely. In effect, this approach appears to be a substantive fairness analysis—at least in part.169
D. Special Scrutiny of the Written Release When the Releasor Acts with an
Otherwise Cognizable Mistake
New York courts look first for a cognizable mistake for purposes of the
mistake doctrine and do so using the unknown injury/unknown consequence
distinction.170 Once a court finds a cognizable mistake, the court must then deal
with the language of the release.171 According to courts in New York, a release
typically stating that the releasor releases the other party with regard to all injuries, known and unknown172 must be “fairly and knowingly made.”173 As the
court in Mangini v. McClurg noted, however, if it is apparent from the language
of the release and the surrounding circumstances that the releasor released the
166

Id. at 1070.
Id.
168 See discussion supra Section IV.C.
169 See Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 387 (Colo. 1981), in which the court found summary judgment improper for an injured party’s claims though the injured party’s guardian
had entered into the settlement and signed the release two years after the injury and with the
assistance of counsel. There had been negotiation and the probate court approved the release.
Id. at 380; see discussion of traditional doctrine supra Section IV.C.
170 See discussion supra Section V.A.; see also Mangini v. McClurg, 249 N.E.2d 386, 391
(N.Y. 1969).
171 See, e.g., Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 390 (“[T]he traditional bases for setting aside written
agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake, must be established or else
the release stands.”).
172 See releases quoted and discussed supra Part I.
173
See, e.g., Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 392 (quoting Farrington v. Harlem Sav. Bank, 19
N.E.2d 657, 657 (N.Y. 1939)); see also Ford v. Phillips, 994 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2014). Washington follows a similar approach. See Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 97 P.3d
11, 14 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (“A release may be avoided if (1) there is an unknown or latent injury discovered after the release was executed and (2) the plaintiff proves the release
was not fairly and knowingly made.”) (citation omitted); Finch v. Carlton, 524 P.2d 898, 901
(Wash. 1974) (en banc) (finding the same).
167
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other party from all liability even for unknown injuries, so be it.174 Indeed, the
court noted that a circumstance such as this was very likely:
It requires particular emphasis that, more often than not, the releasors in personal injury cases are willing to settle for relatively small sums or sums that do not
discount injuries unknown at the time because of the doubtful liability of the releasee, even when ordinary caution would suggest awaiting the development of
unknown injuries or consequences. When that is the inducement it would be
false reasoning to assume that the amount of the settlement or the precipitousness of effecting the settlement is corroborative of a mutual mistake.175

While more bounded than the approach used in the Witt case, this approach
also is, at least in part, a substantive fairness analysis. Because the approach also focuses on whether the release was knowingly made, there also appears to be
a focus on whether in fact the release was formed as a result of proper process.
E. Applying Traditional Doctrine in the Traditional Way
Some courts have refused to set aside releases on the basis of a claim of
mistake relating to the injuries suffered.176 In Bernstein v. Kapneck, the Maryland court, writing in the early 1980s, reviewed the treatment personal injury
releases had received across the United States historically and refused to set
aside the release before it.177 In Bernstein a child suffered injuries as a result of
an automobile collision.178 Approximately three years after the collision and
after consulting with counsel, the child’s mother entered into a release in exchange for $7,500.179 After the settlement the child began exhibiting a seizure
174

Mangini, 249 N.E.2d at 391 (holding that a release must be enforced if the language of
the release or circumstances show “a conscious and deliberate intention to discharge liability”).
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., Coomer v. Phelps, 172 S.W.3d 389, 391–92 (Ky. 2005). The Coomer court reaffirmed the rule of the jurisdiction set out in Trevathan v. Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614 (Ky.
1975), that a lack of knowledge or understanding about injuries at the time of the signing of
a release is not a recognizable mistake for purposes of setting aside the release. The court
stated:
To retreat from this rule would cast great doubt on the finality of releases in this state and unnecessarily complicate settlement considerations. As the Court noted in Trevathan, “[t]his rule
favors the orderly settlement of disputes and avoids multiplicity of suits and the chaos which
would result if the releases were not treated seriously by the courts.” We see no need to retreat
from this rule, thus we expressly reaffirm the holding of Trevathan.

Coomer, 172 S.W.3d at 391 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Trevathan v.
Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1975)); see also Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d
1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Guam law); Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 605
(Md. 1981); Raymond v. Feldmann, 853 P.2d 297, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc); Leyda
v. Norelli, 564 A.2d 244, 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 741
(Wyo. 2001).
177 Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 605.
178 Id. at 603 (describing that the child had a facial laceration, chip fractures of the nasal
bones, a fracture of a shoulder, and traumatic neurosis).
179 Id. The release stated in part:
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disorder related to the collision.180 The mother sought to have the release set
aside.181 Thus, the court was faced with a very compelling case in terms of
compassion.
But the Bernstein court took a different route, noting that many courts have
been motivated by compassion for the insured to set aside “long established and
well understood rules of contract law, which . . . normally apply to releases.”182
The court acknowledged that some courts may be motivated by a desire to prevent an injured party from becoming a public charge.183 The court also noted
the competing policies of encouraging compromise, of honoring the freedom of
contract, and of applying traditional contract rules.184
With regard to findings of mistake by other courts, the Bernstein court noted that the courts reach their results by “an utterly inappropriate application of
the mutual mistake of fact doctrine to factual circumstances which not only do
not present a mutual misconception of basic fact, but often do not appear to involve a mistake by even one party.”185 The court did not believe that “violence
to the human body presents a unique situation” that would validate “the bastardization of the well-founded principles concerning mutual mistake of
fact.”186
With regard to interpretation, the court stated: “[W]e are convinced that our
society will be best served by adherence to the traditional methodology for interpreting contracts in general, including other species of releases.”187 In criticizing the approach taken by other courts, the Bernstein court stated:
This approach often overlooks or avoids the words used by the parties to express
their agreement and in its place substitutes undefined conjecture as to what the
releasor would have intended if the full extent of the injuries had been known at
the time of the compact. Thus, these courts depart from the otherwise settled
rules of construction which, for the most part, have operated satisfactorily for

For the sole consideration of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars . . . Helen M. Bernstein, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Irene Schulman, a minor, hereby releases and
forever discharges Barbara Sue Sussman . . . and all other persons, firms or corporations liable
for or who might claim to be liable, . . . from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions,
causes of action, or suits of whatsoever kind or nature, and particularly on account of loss or
damage to the property and on account of bodily injuries, known and unknown, and which have
resulted or may in the future develop, sustained . . . in consequence of an accident involving the
automobile accident occurring on or about July 25, 1975.

Id. at 604 (emphasis omitted).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 605 (citation omitted).
183 Id. at 606. The Bernstein court criticizes other courts for not “openly balancing these policies” in reaching their conclusion in favor of the injured party. Id. at 607.
184 Id. at 606.
185 Id. at 607.
186 Id. at 607–08.
187 Id. at 606.
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centuries, in order to dispose of particularly distressing cases in a compassionate
and seemingly just manner.188

Finally, the Bernstein court turned to the release before it, which released
all claims relating to “bodily injuries, known and unknown.”189 The court concluded that “[i]t would require turning the English language on its head to conclude that, from these words used, the releasors did not by this document exhibit a clear desire to extinguish the claim for the damages they now seek.”190
Similarly, in Morta v. Korea Insurance Corporation, the court reached the
issue of the value to be given to the writing.191 In Morta, a party injured in an
automobile collision, after consulting with counsel, signed a release in exchange for compensation.192 Later, the injured party claimed that the release
was the product of fraud, undue influence, or mistake in that he did not read the
release and did not understand that it applied to injuries of which he was not
aware.193 The federal court, applying Guam law, found no evidence of fraud or
undue influence.194 In addition, the court found no mistake because the injured
party had the opportunity to read the release and have it explained to him by his
counsel.195
Addressing the claim that the release should not be read to apply to unknown injuries, the Morta court noted that the release was unambiguous and,
by its terms, the injured party released the other party from all claims “growing
out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and
personal injuries and property damage” arising from the incident relating to the
injuries.196 The injured party argued that the release should not be held to release unknown claims unless evidence extrinsic to the writing supported that
interpretation.197 The court refused to adopt such an approach, choosing to rely
on the writing, the release, and not on evidence extrinsic to that writing,198 noting that “it is exceedingly difficulty [sic] to know what parties really thought
188

Id. at 607.
Id. at 604; see supra note 179 for the release language.
190 Bernstein, 430 A.2d at 609.
191 Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Guam law).
192 Id. at 1454–55.
193 Id. at 1455, 1457–58. The injured party claimed that he was not aware of a blood clot in
his brain that necessitated surgery. Id. at 1455, 1458.
194 Id. at 1456–57.
195 Id. at 1458.
196 Id. at 1458 n.7.
197 Id. at 1459.
198 Id. The Morta court stated:
189

Written instruments, fixing the parties’ rights and responsibilities by mutual consent, bring an
important measure of order to life and greatly facilitate the adjudicatory process. While interpreting contract language is not always easy, sticking to the words the parties actually used limits substantially the bounds of legitimate disagreement. This objective rule thus “favors the orderly settlement of disputes and avoids multiplicity of suits and the chaos which would result if
the releases were not treated seriously by the courts.”

Id. (quoting Trevathan v. Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1975)).
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many years back and virtually impossible to divine what they would have
thought had they but known something they did not.”199
VI. THE POLICIES AT PLAY
Why is it that some courts treat claims of mistake regarding personal injury
releases differently? What is the basis for reforming the mistake doctrine so
that a claim of mistake in a personal injury release setting is cognizable, or for
short-circuiting established agreement interpretation canons? Several policies
are at play. On the one hand are the policies in favor of enforcing contracts
freely entered into and the policy in favor of encouraging settlement. On the
other side of the ledger, courts have spoken of the unknowability of the human
body and thus its injuries, a desire that injured parties be compensated by the
wrongdoer and not become a public burden, the noncommercial context, and a
need to protect injured parties because of their weakness or lesser bargaining
position.
A. Freedom of Contract Should Be Honored
Courts enforce contracts unless there is a very good reason not to do so.200
There is a long-recognized understanding that keeping and enforcing promises
has a moral dimension as well as a utilitarian one.201 Our system of economic
ordering depends on individual actors being able to enter into agreements with
regard to the future and have some degree of confidence that those agreements
will be enforced.202 The parties’ expectations are honored and the transactional
world enjoys stability. Enforcing contracts and therefore honoring freedom of
contract also touches upon respect for the autonomy of each individual actor in
that individuals contract as they see fit and the courts honor each individual’s
choice. Thus, each actor has the right and power to contract as he or she chooses and courts honor that choice without second-guessing. This exercise of individual choice in contracting and the respect given that choice by courts’ enforcement of contracts is a facet of liberty.203 As the United States Supreme
199

Id. at 1460; see also Raymond v. Feldmann, 853 P.2d 297, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en
banc) (noting mutual mistake is not a basis for setting aside a personal injury release).
200 See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1887) (“[P]ublic policy and
the interests of society favor the utmost freedom of contract, within the law . . .”).
201 See MURRAY, supra note 2, § 1, at 2 (“Historically and philosophically, the most fundamental concept of contract is that promises ought to be kept.”).
202 See EV3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 529 n.3 (Del. 2014) (“Delaware courts seek to ensure freedom of contract and promote clarity in the law in order to facilitate commerce.”)
(citation omitted); see also MURRAY, supra note 2, § 6, at 15 (“By facilitating future exchanges, the institution of contract brings persons and resources together as a necessary condition to the operation of the market system.”).
203 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2
(2d ed. 2015) (“The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions individuals make
of their rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have
rights.”); see also Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 707 F.2d 1566, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“A
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Court has stated, “[T]he right of private contract is no small part of the liberty
of the citizen, and . . . the usual and most important function of courts of justice
is . . . to maintain and enforce contracts . . . .”204
Even so, the courts have developed several narrow doctrines over the years
for identifying situations in which the contract or its formation is flawed. In the
rare situation in which the facts fit one of these doctrines, a court might rescind
the contract to obtain a superior justice than would result from enforcing the
contract. Today’s courts rarely set aside contracts or refuse to enforce contracts,
but if they do, they do so because those contracts are the product of fraud, duress, mistake, or another recognized contract avoidance doctrine.205
Courts long have been wary of engaging in a review of the substantive
fairness of an agreement and do so only when such a review is a part of a recognized doctrine such as unconscionability.206 For example, in Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., the court stated:
Under the traditional principles of contract law, the parties to a contract are free
to make their bargain, even if the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or
of dubious value. Absent fraud or unconscionability, the adequacy of consideration is not a proper subject for judicial scrutiny. It is enough that something of
“real value in the eye of the law” was exchanged.207

Thus, this freedom of contract carries with it a downside—the freedom to
make an improvident deal. To honor the freedom of contract is to enforce the
bad deal absent a recognized flaw addressed by a recognized contract avoid-

basic principle of contract law is the concept of freedom of contract—the right of the contracting parties to structure their transactions in accordance with their wishes.”). In fact, the
United States Constitution protects the freedom of contract. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
1.
204 Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (discussing setting aside a
contract on the basis of public policy). See generally Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of
Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999) (discussing the relationship
of freedom to freedom of contract).
205 See 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: AVOIDANCE AND REFORMATION
§§ 28–29 (rev. ed. 2002 Supp. 2016) (discussing the doctrines generally).
206 The unconscionability doctrine does call for a substantive fairness review but usually
only when linked with a procedural fairness analysis and in any case the review is done as of
the time the contract was formed, not in hindsight. See discussion infra Section VII.C. A
fairness analysis might also be a part of the unilateral mistake doctrine, at least as the doctrine is delineated by the Restatement, but there the analysis is also linked to a finding of
blameworthiness on the part of the other party to the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also supra Section IV.D.
207 Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (N.Y. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Thomsen v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 606 F.3d 905, 911 (8th Cir. 2010)
(“Whether Thomsen made a wise bargain is irrelevant, as unambiguous contract language
‘shall be enforced by courts even if the result is harsh.’ ”) (quoting Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 347 (Minn. 2003)); Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 953 (1958) (reasoning courts should not delve into fairness analysis). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 4.1, at 218 (“[C]ourts have been
most reluctant to view the problem in the first perspective, that of substantive unfairness.”).
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ance doctrine. As one court has stated, “the general rule of freedom of contract
includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.”208
B. Settlement of Disputes Outside of Courts Should Be Encouraged
Because releases settle disputes, the universally-recognized policy in favor
of settlement is relevant. The starting point is the idea that settlement of controversies outside of courts is a positive result which courts should encourage.209
Courts recognized this policy long ago and continue to do so even in this time
of plentiful settlements.210 The policy is present in court decisions and also is
manifested in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which makes settlement a
proper topic for the pretrial conference.211 Settlements have value only if they
are respected, so it is the finality of settlement agreements—and releases that
are part of settlement agreements—which furthers the policy of encouraging
settlement.212
The motivating rationale for this pro-settlement policy is a blend of ideas.
First, is the idea that when matters are decided by settlement, there is less burden on the judicial system.213 Some courts also note that settlement is easier on
the parties because it reduces the financial214 and emotional strain215 that litiga208

Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. 1972) (en banc); see also United
Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806 F.2d 1385, 1386 (9th Cir.
1986) (“Wise or not, a deal is a deal.”).
209 See generally Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1992); J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive
Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 60–61 (2016).
210 See Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Iowa 2011) (citing the long-held view that
settlements should be encouraged); see also St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898) (“[S]ettlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute,
without recourse to litigation, are generally favored . . .”). With regard to the commonness of
settlements, see Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 146 (2009) (stating that about twothirds of civil cases settle).
211 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(2)(I); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s
note to 1983 Amendment (The amendments “explicitly recognize[] that it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences” and “it obviously eases crowded
court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system”).
212 See Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 739 P.2d 648, 653 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (discussing the policy in favor of finality of settlement agreements).
213 See, e.g., Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994)
(encouraging settlements to “conserve judicial resources”); see also Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1498
(2016) (discussing the burden on the courts).
214 See, e.g., Vill. of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that settlement allows the parties to avoid the expense and delay that accompanies litigation); see
also David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91–92
(1983) (discussing the financial burden).
215 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2621 (1995) (“Lawsuits are expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, timeconsuming, perhaps all-consuming.”).
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tion and the associated risks can cause. Settlement is also a way that parties can
have more control over the result than is possible in litigation.216
C. Bodily Injuries Are Not Commercial and Are Too Mysterious for the
Common Person to Understand; Injured Parties Are in Need of Protection
Because of Weakness or Bargaining Disparity; Injured Parties Must Be
Compensated
Several motivations may be at work when a court chooses to give special
treatment to personal injury releasors who seek to avoid their releases. Those
attempting to understand motivations note that the situation is not truly commercial and so some of the underpinnings of contract enforcement do not apply.217 Some courts inclined to apply particularly favorable analysis to injured
parties seeking to avoid releases have focused on the fact that a personal injury
release deals with the person and the body, and that there is something unknowable about the workings of the human body.218 Another motivation seems
to be a belief that the injured party needs protection, either because such a person is somehow weak or simply as a result of bargaining disparity.219 Some
courts seem concerned that the blameworthy party will enjoy a windfall at the
expense of the injured party or the public coffers.220 Of course, another implicit
if not explicit motivation is a desire to impose what, in retrospect, appears to
the court to be a substantively fair result.221
216

See, e.g., Natare Corp. v. Aquatic Renovation Sys., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 695, 700 (S.D. Ind.
1997) (“Settlements . . . allow the parties to fashion the outcome of their disputes through
mutual agreement.”).
217 See PERILLO, supra note 205, § 28.34, at 174 (“Social policies favoring the assumption of
entrepreneurial risks as a means of improving market efficiency are not present.”); see also
Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) (explaining
that the consistency needed in commercial setting is not needed here).
218 See, e.g., Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) (“[T]he most complicated and mysterious of all the things that are upon or inhabit the earth.”).
219 See, e.g., Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 751 (Idaho 1966) (addressing the inequality of
bargaining positions); Clancy, 145 N.E.2d at 805 (addressing bargaining inequality).
220 See, e.g., Casey v. Proctor, 378 P.2d 579, 587 (Cal. 1963) (en banc) (“[I]f the releaser is
bound by the literal terms of the release, it has been recognized that he is left to suffer personal injuries without compensation, while the releasee, who usually is an insurer, has received a windfall . . . .”); Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 739 P.2d 648, 653 (Wash. 1987)
(en banc) (discussing the policy of just compensation of injured parties by tortfeasors); see
also Dobbs, supra note 32, at 667 (“But an equally individualistic principle says that the
wrongdoer—not society, or the victim, or the victim’s family, but the wrongdoer—should
pay.”). Of course, taken to its extreme, this argument could justify a position that allows no
settlements at all. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 26–27 (2d ed.
2011) (“Compensation of persons injured by wrongdoing is one of the generally accepted
aims of tort law . . . [U]ncompensated injured persons will represent further costs and problems for society.”).
221 In Ranta v. Rake, the Idaho Supreme Court, writing in 1966 and looking back at earlier
cases, noted that one concern was “the amount of consideration received compared to the
risk of the existence of unknown injuries.” Ranta, 421 P.2d at 751. See Wheeler v. White
Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961) (“Such cases simply hold that it is
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The court in Clancy v. Pacenti, attempted to explain the motivating rationales relating to human biology being unknowable and not a commercial matter
as follows:
In such cases it is not an article of commerce that is involved, but the human
mind and body, still the most complicated and mysterious of all the things that
are upon or inhabit the earth. Here, mistakes are easily made and the consequences are more serious than in any other of the affairs of man. A slight abrasion may mean nothing or it may lead to a malignancy. Insignificant pain may
mean the beginning of a fatal coronary attack or only a slight intestinal disturbance. Yet, a man cannot and does not live in dread of these possibilities. He accepts assurances that all will be well, even though ultimate consequences cannot
be appraised as in matters involving property or services. 222

The Clancy court also addressed the bargaining ability and power rationales, likening the situation of personal injury releases in general to the treatment historically given to releases signed by seamen when dealing with their
employers.223 In this regard, the Clancy court stated:
The sharp economic inequality of the bargaining parties which generally exists
in this class of cases has also been considered by the courts in their consideration of this doctrine. It is by no means as modern an innovation as to some may
appear. Long before personal injury cases began to absorb the common law
courts, the rule was applied to seamen in admiralty cases. That related to contracts between seamen and their employers, but no one can doubt that it has a
considerable bearing upon situations such as are here presented.224

Other earlier cases, like Clancy, rely in part on the historical treatment
courts have given releases for seamen’s injuries.225 Traditionally, courts have
viewed seamen as “wards of admiralty,” and have reviewed releases entered
into by seamen with great scrutiny.226 In 1823 in Harden v. Gordon, the court
stated the standards for the analysis as follows:
[Seamen] are emphatically the wards of the admiralty; and though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in the same manner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their
expectancies, wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trust with their trustees. . . . If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any disproportion in the
not fair to an injured tort victim to hold him to a bargain if it turns out later that the bargain
was grossly unwise.”).
222 Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957).
223 Id.
224 Id. (citation omitted).
225 See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 764–65 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
226
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 247–48 (1942). See Karim v. Finch
Shipping Co., 374 F.3d 302, 310 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Seamen, of course, are wards of admiralty
whose rights federal courts are duty-bound to jealously protect.”) (quoting Bass v. Phx.
Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1985)). For a discussion of the origin of the
treatment of seamen, see Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336, 345 (2d
Cir. 1941) (concluding that at least some of the reason for the special treatment was commerce and national security which benefit when employees are induced to serve at sea).
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bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side, which are not compensated by extraordinary benefits on the other, the judicial interpretation of the transaction, is
that the bargain is unjust and unreasonable, that advantage has been taken of the
situation of the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought to be set aside
as inequitable.227

In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., the United States Supreme Court, in
reviewing a Jones Act case involving a seaman’s personal injury release, stated
that the employer-releasee dealing with the seaman “must affirmatively show
that no advantage has been taken; and his burden is particularly heavy where
there has been inadequacy of consideration.”228
Some of the statements of rationale behind this special treatment seem
loaded with assumptions and prejudices.229 For example, an early statement of
supporting rationale refers to seamen as “a class of persons remarkable for their
rashness, thoughtlessness and improvidence.”230
Some modern courts focus more on the issue of whether the seaman entered into the release knowingly and less on the substantive fairness of the deal.
For example, in Durley v. Offshore Drilling Company, the court stated that the
test is “whether, at the time of relinquishing his rights, the seaman had ‘an in227

Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047).
Garrett, 317 U.S. at 247. The Garrett court noted that this protection is not unusual in
that Congress had taken other steps to protect seaman’s rights. See id. at 246; see also
Rabenstein v. Sealift, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 343, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he burden is upon
one who sets up a seaman’s release to show that it was executed freely, without deception or
coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights.”) (quoting Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248).
229 See Havighurst, supra note 32, at 307 (“This rule had its origin in early times and is
based upon the recognition that most seafaring men are as individuals relatively incapable of
adequately protecting their own interests.”).
230 Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2018); see also The S.S.
Standard. Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., 103 F.2d 437, 438 (2d Cir. 1939) (quoting Brown, 4 F.
Cas. at 409). In Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., the court quoted a passage from an
earlier opinion that sheds great insight on this peculiar view of seamen:
228

On the one side are gentlemen possessed of wealth, and intent, I mean not unfairly, upon augmenting it, conversant in business, and possessing the means of calling in the aid of practical and
professional knowledge. On the other side is a set of men, generally ignorant and illiterate, notoriously and proverbially reckless and improvident, ill provided with the means of obtaining useful information, and almost ready to sign any instrument that may be proposed to them; and on
all accounts requiring protection, even against themselves.

Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d at 341 (quoting The Minerva, 1 Hagg.
Adm., 347, 355 (1825)). The Hume court also stated:
Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen, because
they are unprotected and need counsel; because they are thoughtless and require indulgence; because they are credulous and complying; and are easily overreached. . . . They are considered as
placed under the dominion and influence of men, who have naturally acquired a mastery over
them; and as they have little of the foresight and caution belonging to persons trained in other
pursuits of life, the most rigid scrutiny is instituted into the terms of every contract, in which
they engage.

Id. at 341 n.13 (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No.
6047)).
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formed understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences.’ ”231 The court noted that courts have been concerned with the adequacy of
the settlement consideration only in regard to what that tells courts about the
seaman’s understanding of the deal, not as a review of the substantive fairness
of the deal.232
Perhaps these courts are acknowledging that earlier courts’ opinions of the
contractual capabilities of seamen is no longer true if it ever was. Perhaps seamen of the twenty-first century do not require such paternalism as was presented in cases from an earlier time. Perhaps seamen should be treated like any other party who releases federal rights.233 In any event the broad class of parties
who sign personal injury releases cannot be described as being incapable of
evaluating their situations and weighing their choices and entering into valid
releases in exchange for compensation.
Beyond the suggestions touching upon the injured party’s ability, courts
have also justified lenient treatment of personal injury releasors by noting that
releasors are often in a position of unequal bargaining strength.234 Interestingly,
several courts dealing with the issue of enforcement of personal injury releases
refer approvingly for rationale to a concurring opinion in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a case decided under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA).235 Judge Learned Hand wrote the majority opinion for the
court,236 but some later courts dealing with personal injury releases have
looked, not to the majority opinion, but to Judge Frank’s concurrence as a
touchstone.237 This is true even though the Ricketts case involved a release of
rights under FELA, federal law, not a release of state law rights, and even
though the release was in the employee and employer context rather than the
231

Durley v. Offshore Drilling Co., 288 Fed. App’x 188, 190 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Borne
v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986)). See Rabenstein, 18
F. Supp. 3d at 355 (explaining releasee has the burden of proving that the seaman entered
into the release freely, knowing and understanding his rights but if that is proven, the seaman
will be bound).
232 Durley, 288 Fed. App’x at 190. See Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300,
304 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining the same).
233 Claims related to injuries to seamen are generally federal claims, often under the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012). See, e.g., GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d at 302. See infra
Part VIII for a discussion of a modern federal approach.
234 See, e.g., Clancy v. Pacenti, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957); see also Havighurst, supra note 32, at 308 (noting releasee has “experience, knowledge and economic
power” so “many settlements are undoubtedly unfair”).
235 Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1946). See Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012).
236 The majority opinion in Ricketts stated that the jury in the lower court could have found
that the injured employee of the railroad authorized his attorney to settle only part of the
claim and not to settle the entire matter. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760. Thus, the release that the
employee signed at the direction of the attorney and that he could not read due to his injuries,
was not a bar to the employee recovering against his employer, the railroad. Id.
237 See, e.g., Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Alaska 1978); Gleason v. Guzman, 623
P.2d 378, 384 (Colo. 1981); Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747, 752 (Idaho 1966).
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context of automobile collisions as is true with many personal injury releases.238 In Judge Frank’s view, injured employees—when dealing with employers
regarding releases—were in the same position as seamen since they were “no
less helpless in their trafficking with their employers.”239 Judge Frank concluded that the employee of the railroad who arguably entered into a release of the
railroad for his personal injuries, should be treated “as . . . if he were a seaman.”240
Even if one accepts that seamen should receive protective treatment regarding personal injury releases in terms of heightened scrutiny of the release process or even the substantive fairness of the release as a result of weakness of
bargaining position or ability of seamen, it is quite an analytical journey to
reach Judge Frank’s position that employees under FELA are also weak in
terms of bargaining position or ability such that they should be treated like
seamen. It is then a further journey to the position that all personal injury releasors should enjoy special, favorable treatment as the result of weakness of
bargaining position or ability.
VII. PERSONAL INJURY RELEASES SHOULD NOT RECEIVE SPECIAL TREATMENT
A. The Policies Do Not Require It
Traditional contract law provides that in order to protect the sanctity of
contracts, contracts should be set aside only when a traditional doctrine demands that.241 The avoidance doctrines of mistake, duress, unconscionability,
and such are situations in which the law recognizes that the contract or the process used to form it was flawed. When the question is the enforceability of personal injury releases, the releases should not be set aside unless those traditional doctrines, applied as they would be in other settings, dictate that result. The
fact that the contracts at issue are, in effect, settlement contracts makes the situation one in which courts should especially take care to set aside only those
contracts that are truly problematic under traditional doctrine analysis.
No policy put forward in support of providing more favorable treatment to
personal injury releasors demands that preferential treatment. Personal injury
releases deal with the body and are therefore not commerce in the same sense
238

See, e.g., Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 487 (Vt. 2002) (regarding automobile collision). But see Gleason, 623 P.2d at 380 (regarding accident in employment context).
239 Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 767 (Frank, J., concurring). Judge Frank stated that the United
States Supreme Court in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), had
“broadly hinted that the courts should treat non-maritime employees, with respect to releases
of personal injury claims, just as they treat seamen.” Id. at 760 (Frank, J., concurring). Judge
Frank pointed to footnote seventeen of the Garrett case for this broad hint. Id. However,
footnote seventeen simply noted several maritime cases as well as non-maritime cases that
the Court referred to as “somewhat comparable.” Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248 n.17.
240 Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 769 (Frank, J., concurring).
241 See discussion supra Section VI.A.
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that agreements relating to widgets are commerce—but releases are a sort of
commerce nonetheless. The parties to the release are attempting to create certainty in a matter about which there is uncertainty. The releasor seeks compensation sooner rather than later and seeks the certainty of payment that may not
occur at all if the parties do not agree to settle the matter. The releasor seeks to
eliminate further worry and expense that would occur without the settlement.
The other party likewise seeks to settle the matter without further time and
money commitments. This party, too, seeks to end the matter and thus gain certainty with regard to the ultimate cost of the matter. There is always uncertainty
about the injuries and their eventual path, just as there are uncertainties about
whether a widget maker will be able to provide the widgets as agreed.
Nor is this unknowability regarding bodily injuries such that an injured
party must be protected more than traditional contract doctrine otherwise provides. As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling
Company of Oregon:
When courts recite, for example, as a matter of more or less common
knowledge, that terminal tumors sometimes begin with minor contusions, or
otherwise concern themselves with details of tragedy that may stalk those who
sign early releases, they are not announcing truths known only to lawyers. These
matters are also commonly known by laymen.242

Perhaps members of society were less aware of the nature of human biology at some point in the past, but today the Wheeler court is correct. Members of
society who are injured in automobile collisions and other accidents of life understand the possibilities of their injuries.
Similarly, the notion that the releasor in a personal injury release situation
is somehow incapable of understanding the transaction he or she enters into
when signing a release is, simply, preposterous. People who find themselves in
automobile crashes are, one would imagine, a fair sampling of society as a
whole: everyone gets into car accidents. Releasors are neither weaker of mind
nor stronger of mind than the populace as a whole. It is not a complex notion
that injuries from an automobile collision or other such event may not have
manifested at the time of the signing of the release. The language of the releases, though perhaps awkward, is not difficult to understand. And a party who
reads a document that says that in exchange for a certain sum of money that
party is agreeing to forego all claims regarding known and unknown injuries or
effects, can easily understand what that means. Unlike a loan document with
complex payment and liability language,243 a personal injury release actually
deals with a subject matter every person understands, his or her own body. The
release is also a part of a fairly simple transaction, an exchange of compensa-

242

Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961).
See, e.g., Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640, 654 (W. Va. 2012) (discussing
a confusing loan transaction).
243
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tion in exchange for a promise to look no more to the releasee. The release is
typically not complex and comprises one or two pages.244
Further, because a personal injury release follows a calamitous event, parties of today are very often represented at the time they sign the release.245
These attorneys should be assisting the injured parties, their clients, in understanding the realm of possible outcomes regarding their injuries as well as assisting the injured parties in understanding exactly what the release means in
terms of risk assumption.
In addition, an injured party is not necessarily in a bargaining position that
would demand special treatment by the courts. The injured party may be the
less sophisticated party to the settlement if the other side of the deal is, as is often the case, being handled by an insurer, but, again, the injured party often has
the benefit of counsel. While the language of the release is often that of the releasee, the injured party can and often does negotiate with regard to the amount
of compensation.246 Ultimately, the injured party can refuse to settle the matter
and opt to pursue litigation.
Finally, general tort policy that wrongdoers should compensate injured parties so those parties do not become a burden on society is too general a policy
to justify special treatment for personal injury releases. With a personal injury
release in exchange for compensation, the wrongdoer is compensating the injured party the amount the injured party agrees is sufficient. Is the law to say
that the injured party cannot be the judge of that amount and that the courts
should always be the ultimate decider? While the issue of the burden on society
is not present in the commercial dispute setting, even there the policy of requiring the wrongdoer to compensate the harmed party is present. Should settlement agreements not be allowed? Tort policy should not trump contract policy
in this way.
B. The Current Situation is Problematic for Traditional Doctrines
As the Maryland court in Bernstein v. Kapneck court stated, “violence to
the human body” does not justify “the bastardization of the well-founded principles concerning mutual mistake of fact” or any other contract doctrine.247 Not
only is the policy justification for special treatment for personal injury releasors
lacking, but also the courts, in applying the traditional mistake doctrine differently and in refusing to give traditional treatment to the releases signed by personal injury releasors, may be doing subtle harm to traditional contract doc244

See discussion supra Part I.
See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir. 1988).
246 See, e.g., Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014)
(explaining the releasee initially offered Hicks $2000; Hicks countered with $7000; the releasee then offered $2500; Hicks countered with $5000; the releasee then offered $3000;
Hicks reiterated a demand of $5000; the releasee then offered $4000; Hicks accepted).
247 Bernstein v. Kapneck, 430 A.2d 602, 607–08 (Md. 1981).
245
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trine. While mistake doctrine has never been the model of clarity, the treatment
courts have given personal injury releases under the guise of mistake doctrine
has done nothing to clarify the proper bounds of the doctrine. Indeed, while
such an effect cannot be measured, the bastardization of the doctrine may cause
damage to its rational application in other settings. In effect, to misuse it in the
personal injury release setting is to do damage to the doctrine for all purposes.
The same may be true for the value given the written document for purposes of
adding to it or interpreting its words.
In many cases, courts may be simply reviewing the releases on a substantive fairness basis explicitly or surreptitiously.248 In contrast, courts generally
have not reviewed contracts for fairness.249 Courts have long noted that they
would not review adequacy of consideration—a fairness analysis; that was the
job of the parties to the contract.250 It is true that unconscionability doctrine allows for a substantive fairness analysis, but most courts link that analysis with a
procedural analysis as well.251
The superior approach is to treat personal injury releases as other contracts
are treated. Courts should not bend or reform current traditional contract doctrine to reach a result desired.
C. The Unconscionability Doctrine May Be Useful
Though mistake doctrine is not a useful doctrine when properly applied to
the situation of personal injury releases, unconscionability doctrine might be
useful just as duress and fraud could be useful with the right facts. Historically,
releasors seeking to have personal injury releases set aside have not turned to
the contract unconscionability doctrine as a means of achieving that end.252
248

See Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Or., 366 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1961) (“Such
cases simply hold that it is not fair to an injured tort victim to hold him to a bargain if it turns
out later that the bargain was grossly unwise.”).
249 See Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Del. Ch. 1992), in which the court stated:
“The notion that a court can and will review contracts for fairness is apt for good reason to
strike us as dangerous, subjecting negotiated bargains to the loosely constrained review of
the judicial process.”
250 See, e.g., Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (N.Y. 1993). The
Apfel court stated: “Under the traditional principles of contract law, the parties to a contract
are free to make their bargain, even if the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or of
dubious value. Absent fraud or unconscionability, the adequacy of consideration is not a
proper subject for judicial scrutiny.” Id. (citation omitted).
251 See, e.g., Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 403 P.3d 1014, 1022–23 (Wyo.
2017) (requiring both substantive and procedural unfairness); see also discussion infra Section VII.C.
252 While some courts have examined whether a release has unconscionable effect as part of
a mistake doctrine analysis, such an examination of unconscionable effect considers the situation in hindsight. See, e.g., Simmons v. Blauw, 635 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(applying an unconscionable effect analysis); Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142, 144–46 (Mont.
1989) (citing to Uniform Commercial Code unconscionability doctrine provision but considering post-contract evidence).
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Though the concept of unconscionability has existed in the common law for a
very long time,253 its clear recognition as a doctrine coalesced in the middle of
the twentieth century with states’ adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code.254 Section 2-302 of the Code provides that a court may refuse to enforce
a contract or a part of a contract on the basis of unconscionability. Section 2302 states, in part:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.255

Following this example, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts added a new unconscionability provision, Section 208, which states:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.256

Courts have struggled to develop a principled approach to the unconscionability doctrine. Many courts follow a two-pronged analysis that focuses on
procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.257 An agreement or provision is procedurally unconscionable if it is the result of defective
bargaining process.258 Substantive unconscionability is present when the
agreement’s terms are unreasonably favorable to one of the parties to the
deal.259 As one court has stated, “[s]ubstantive unconscionability occurs when
253

See McCullough, supra note 36, at 787 (discussing the history of the doctrine and noting
that the concept dates back to at least the seventeenth century; early cases were treated as
public policy cases).
254 A draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was completed in 1951. Pennsylvania adopted
it in 1953. After the New York Law Revision Commission critically studied the proposal, a
revised draft was created in 1958. New York adopted the revised version and other states did
as well. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 362 (2017). See also generally Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 19491954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359, 375 (2001) (discussing the drafting and adoption process). The
UCC recognizes unconscionability. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 149–50 (“[Unconscionability’s] acceptance as a mainstream doctrine, a ready aid in contract limitation, dates back only
to its inclusion in the UCC.”).
255 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). This provision applies only to goods transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (“Unless the context otherwise requires, this
Article applies to transactions in goods”).
256 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
257 See, e.g., State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Kindred
Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 403 P.3d 1014, 1022 (Wyo. 2017).
258 See Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah
1985) (cataloguing all sorts of procedural bargaining irregularities); see also MURRAY, supra
note 2, § 97, at 541.
259 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (“[C]ontract
terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, an overall imbalance
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the terms of the agreement are so one-sided that no one in his right mind would
agree to its terms.”260 Some courts require both forms of unconscionability, although some of these courts apply a sliding scale such that a lower level of one
type of unconscionability can be offset by a greater level of the other type of
unconscionability.261
One aspect of the doctrine that is clear is that the analysis of whether the
contract or provision is unconscionable must consider the situation at the time
of the contract’s formation.262 Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement explicitly state that the unconscionability must exist at the time the
contract is made.263
Unfortunately, the typical personal injury releasor likely will not find the
unconscionability doctrine to be a friendly port in the storm.264 Such a plaintiff
must illustrate that the release was procedurally unconscionable.265 The typical
release and settlement that the release is a part of is not a complex transaction.266 The plaintiff gets money in exchange for ceasing to pursue any claim

in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain . . .”); see also McCullough, supra note
36, at 797.
260 West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 213 (Miss. 2004).
261 See, e.g., Kindred, 403 P.3d at 1023 (“In other words, both the absence of meaningful
choice and the presence of contract provisions unreasonably favorable to one party must be
found in order to sustain a claim that a contract is unconscionable.”) (citing Roussalis v.
Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 246 (Wyo. 2000)); James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d
799, 815 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“The analysis is unitary, and ‘it is generally agreed that if more of
one is present, then less of the other is required.’ ”) (quoting E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 1
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 585 (3d ed. 2004)).With regard to the sliding scale
nature of the analysis, see Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (“However, in general, it can be
said that procedural and substantive unconscionability operate on a ‘sliding scale’; the more
questionable the meaningfulness of choice, the less imbalance in a contract’s terms should be
tolerated and vice versa”) (quoting Jonathan A. Eddy, On the Essential Purposes of Limited
Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 41, 42 n.56
(1977)); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 12 (2012). Other courts
seem to allow a finding of unconscionability with only one form of unconscionability. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, No. CV-17-02133-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 637382, at *5
(D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2018) (requiring only substantive unconscionability).
262 See James, 132 A.3d at 814 (“Whether a contract is unconscionable is determined at the
time it was made”); see also Doctor’s Assocs. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996)
(explaining the same); Clift v. RDP Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (explaining the same).
263 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“unconscionable at
the time it was made”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“unconscionable at the time the contract is made”).
264 See, e.g., Maglin v. Tschannerl, 800 A.2d 486, 491 (Vt. 2002) (“Because she had an opportunity for meaningful choice when the release was presented to her, any differential in
bargaining power was not critical to the contract’s formation and not enough to void the release as unconscionable.”).
265 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
266 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

19 NEV. L.J. 535, GIESEL

578

4/25/2019 8:36 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

against the other party.267 The actual release document is often one or two pages and the language used is relatively clear that the injured party is releasing his
or her claim for all injuries related to the event, whether or not the injuries are
known at the time of the release.268 The release is often the product of some negotiation over time with the actual amount to be paid changing in the midst of
the back-and-forth.269 While it is certainly true that in most cases the injured
party does not create the language of the release and simply accepts that language, it is also true that the injured party could refuse to enter into the agreement if the terms are unacceptable or could demand more in exchange for the
executed release. Often, the releasor has the benefit of an attorney’s assistance
as well.270 In such circumstances it is difficult to find that the release is the
product of procedural unconscionability.
An injured party might have an easier time illustrating that the deal is substantively unconscionable but only if the determination of unconscionability is
made after the injuries have all come to light.271 Yet, the unconscionability doctrine requires that the determination of unconscionability be a determination
that the agreement was unconscionable at the time of the formation of the release, not as it later appears with the benefit of hindsight.272 Thus, the unconscionability doctrine, if properly applied, will rarely be the basis for a refusal to
enforce a personal injury release.

267

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I and Section IV.C.
269 See, e.g., Hicks v. Sparks, No. 522, 2013, 2014 WL 1233698, at *1 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014)
(explaining the automobile collision occurred in March and the release was signed in October. The releasee initially offered Hicks $2000. Hicks countered with $7000. The releasee
then offered $2500. Hicks countered with $5000. The releasee then offered $3000. Hicks
reiterated a demand of $5000. The releasee then offered $4000 which Hicks accepted); see
also Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1966–67 (Alaska 1978) (noting release signed seven
months after automobile collision and after negotiation).
270 See, e.g., Witt, 579 P.2d at 1067 (noting attorney consulted); Simmons v. Blauw, 635
N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting attorney negotiated on her behalf).
271 See Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142, 145 (Mont. 1989). The Kelly court found that the
lower court should not have granted summary judgment for the released party because the
injured party had raised a question of material fact as to whether the release was unconscionable—that is, “whether under all the circumstances, justice was done.” Id. at 146. The court
noted the injured party was in dire financial straits, that she lacked education, that she lacked
legal advice, that her living arrangements were isolating, that “there was substantial uncertainty as to the extent of injury . . . and the future prognosis,” and that the settlement had occurred in a hasty fashion. Id. at 145. In so doing the court strayed from traditional unconscionability jurisprudence by noting that “facts subsequent to a settlement may be considered
in determining unconscionability.” Id. at 146.
272 See James v. Nat’l Fin. LLC., 132 A.3d 799, 814 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Whether a contract is
unconscionable is determined at the time it was made.”); see also Doctor’s Assocs. v.
Jabush, 89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996); Clift v. RDP Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (W.D.
Ky. 2016); U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“unconscionable at
the time it was made.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“unconscionable at the time the contract is made.”).
268
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VIII. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE: INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE
RELEASOR SIGNED THE RELEASE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY: A PROCESS
ANALYSIS
If, after a thoughtful consideration of all policy arguments involved, a court
is of the opinion that personal injury releasors should, categorically, receive
more deference than traditional contract law provides, the better approach, as
compared to the current situation, is for courts to forthrightly create a release
review doctrine apart from traditional common law contract principles. Such an
approach makes clear that personal injury releases are subject to special treatment and the justification for such treatment can be clearly stated and understood. In addition, traditional doctrine would no longer suffer the indignity of
being twisted into something far different from its traditional profile.273 In creating such a release review doctrine, courts should not create a paternalistic
substantive fairness review, but rather courts should respect the autonomy of
the parties by using a review focused on process.
The federal approach to releases of certain federal rights is an example of
such a stand-alone release review doctrine. When a court reviews the validity
and enforceability of a release of certain federal rights, that court must ensure
that the releasor entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily.274 In so
doing, the courts consider the totality of circumstances.275 Courts have created
lists of factors to guide the totality of circumstances analysis of the process resulting in the release being signed.276 A good example of this approach is that
of the Eleventh Circuit, which has identified the following factors as objective
evidence to consider:
1. the releasor’s education and business experience;
2. the amount of time the releasor had to review the agreement before signing it;
3. “the clarity of the agreement;”
4. the releasor’s opportunity to be advised by an attorney;
5. the other party’s encouragement or discouragement of consultation with
an attorney; and
6. “the consideration given in exchange for the waiver when compared
with the benefits to which the employee was already entitled.”277
273

See discussion supra Section IV.B.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (regarding a Title VII
matter; “a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee’s consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing.”). See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
65 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 1995) (regarding ADEA matter; “knowingly and voluntary[ily].”).
275 See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir.
2007); Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 281 F.3d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 2002).
276 See, e.g., Cuchara v. Gai-Tronics Corp., 129 Fed. App’x 728, 731 (3d Cir. 2005); Pierce,
65 F.3d at 571.
277 See Myricks, 480 F.3d at 1040; see also Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 86 F.3d
196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996).
274
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Other jurisdictions use slightly different factors.278 In discussing the nonexclusive factors used by the Seventh Circuit, the court in Pierce v. Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company acknowledged that the court was
providing a system of evaluation of a release that can include evidence extrinsic
to an unambiguous writing, but limited that evidence to objective evidence
from disinterested third parties, not a party’s subjective, possibly self-serving
testimony.279 The Pierce court justified its approach of special scrutiny of releases, even those facially unambiguous, as appropriate to support “the strong
congressional purpose underlying the ADEA to eradicate discrimination in employment.”280 Thus, releases of federal rights are not only subject to review on
any traditional contract basis such as duress or fraud or mistake, but also such
releases are governed by the idiosyncratic knowing and voluntary requirement
implemented with the totality of circumstances analysis.281 That special treatment is clearly and tightly tied to a significant public policy and is done in
recognition of other policies at play such as the policy in favor of settlement,
even settlement of disputes regarding federally-prohibited discrimination.282
278

For example, in Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., the court established the
approach for the Seventh Circuit. Pierce, 65 F.3d at 571. The court, reviewing a release of an
employee’s age and racial discrimination claims under the ADEA, provided the following
list of non-exclusive factors to consider when determining whether the release was entered
into knowingly and voluntarily:
1. the employee’s education and business experience;
2. the employee’s input in negotiating the terms of the settlement;
3. the clarity of the agreement;
4. the amount of time the employee had for deliberation before signing the release;
5. whether the employee actually read the release and considered its terms before signing it;
6. whether the employee was represented by counsel or consulted with an attorney;
7. whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeded the benefits to which the
employee was already entitled by contract or law; and
8. whether the employee’s release was induced by improper conduct on the defendant’s part.

Id. (citation omitted). Contrary to the Seventh Circuit approach, other courts do not include
whether the releasor read the release as a factor. These courts apparently hold the more traditional view that a party signing a document has the obligation to read it. For example, in
Russell v. Harman Int’l Indus., the court reviewed a release of ERISA claims. Russell v.
Harman Int’l Indus., 945 F. Supp. 2d 68, 74 (D.D.C. 2013). The Russell court found the release to be knowing and voluntary and noted that the releasor who signs a document without
reading it is held to that document. Id. at 75. See Gaub v. Prof’l Hosp. Supply, Inc., 845 F.
Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D. Idaho 2012) (reasoning the court would not accept a failure to read
as a factor).
279 Pierce, 65 F.3d at 568.
280 Id. at 571 (ADEA is the acronym for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). See
Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522–23 (3d Cir. 1988) (“In light of the strong
policy concerns to eradicate discrimination in employment, a review of the totality of the
circumstances, considerate of the particular individual who has executed the release, is also
necessary.”).
281 See, e.g., Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 17 CV 2343, 2018 WL 558501, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2626 (7th Cir. July 26, 2018).
282 See, e.g., Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 460–61 (9th Cir.1989) (“A
general release of Title VII claims does not ordinarily violate public policy. To the contrary,
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One factor that has received particular emphasis in the federal analysis is
the assistance of an attorney. Courts have stated that if the releasor had the benefit of the advice of counsel regarding the release and if the release is unambiguous by its own terms, a presumption arises the release is valid and enforceable.283 While the result of such a presumption and thus the result of the totality
of the circumstances analysis may then be a conclusion that the releasor knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement such that the party has released
important federal rights, courts have recognized that they should not attempt to
subvert traditional principles and interpret subjective intent. Rather, the releasor
must be left to the deal the releasor formed—supplemented by a possible malpractice action against the lawyer.284 Even in a situation in which the releasor
chooses not to consult with counsel, that choice can be powerful, especially if
the other party suggested consulting counsel would be helpful.285
Courts who, after carefully evaluating the competing policies, conclude
that personal injury releasors should receive more favorable treatment than parties to other agreements might turn to a similar knowing and voluntary analysis.
Such an approach would allow for a careful review of the process surrounding
the signing of a release. A court using such an approach could consider such
process factors as the education and experience of the releasor, whether the releasor had ample opportunity to review the release, whether the releasor enjoyed the assistance of counsel, whether the releasor was discouraged or encouraged to consult with counsel, and whether the release was clear or
confusingly complex. This sort of analytical framework would allow the court
to come to a principled decision as to whether the release should be enforced
and should create an environment in which a court might be less likely to be
swayed by a releasor’s subjective, hindsight statements that he or she did not
intend to enter into the deal spelled out by the release itself. A framework that
explicitly considers such factors as the clarity of the writing and whether the
releasor was represented forces a focus on what an extraordinary move it is to
set such a release aside.

public policy favors voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII.”) (quoting Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986)).
283 See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d, 1036, 1041 (11th Cir.
2007) (“[A]n employee’s decision to consult an attorney before signing a clear release creates a presumption that the release is enforceable.”); Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881
F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] plaintiff who executes a release within the context of a
settlement pursuant to the advice of independent counsel is presumed to have executed the
document knowingly and voluntarily absent claims of fraud or duress.”).
284 See Riley, 881 F.2d at 374 (“[T]hat plaintiff’s counsel may have inaccurately conveyed
the effect of the release . . . may be remedied through a malpractice action, but not through
judicial interpretation of plaintiff’s subjective intent.”).
285 See, e.g., Cuchara v. Gai-Tronics Corp., 129 Fed. App’x 728, 731 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding
it “particularly significant” that Cuchara was repeatedly advised in writing to obtain the services of counsel).
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CONCLUSION
Many courts long have treated personal injury releases differently from
other contracts when releasors have sought to avoid the effect of the releases.
These courts have striven to provide more favorable treatment to personal injury releasors by modifying contract mistake doctrine to make it possible for the
doctrine to apply in situations in which it otherwise would not apply. In addition, contrary to what is true with typical written agreements, some courts have
not given the traditional respect to the writing when the writing is a personal
injury release that the releasor seeks to avoid. Thus, these releasor-friendly approaches have found legally-cognizable mistakes and have failed to recognize
any assumption of the risk by the releasor as a result of the releasor’s conscious
ignorance or by the express words of the release.
Courts should no longer provide special treatment for personal injury releasors. The releases should be enforced unless a recognized contract avoidance
doctrine, traditionally applied, dictates otherwise. The policies behind more favorable treatment of personal injury releasors are particularly suspect in the
twenty-first century world. In addition, idiosyncratic modifications to traditional contract doctrines done in the name of this special treatment may do broader
violence to those doctrines and to the policies underlying contract enforcement
generally and settlement agreements in particular.
While the typical personal injury releasor cannot successfully claim mistake, other contract doctrines may provide assistance if the facts of the situation
at hand fit the doctrine. The unconscionability doctrine traditionally has not
been used but should be considered along with the other avoidance doctrines
that may be claimed, such as fraud and duress. If a release was unconscionable
when the agreement was formed, the unconscionability doctrine provides an
avenue of relief from the release.
And if a court, after careful consideration, believes the personal injury release situation deserves more scrutiny, perhaps a process analysis focusing on
whether the release was knowingly and voluntarily made, patterned after the
analysis used with releases of certain federal rights, would be a superior alternative to an analysis that lacks a workable framework of analysis and thus
opens the door to ad hoc hindsight judgments by courts as to the fairness of the
deal struck by the parties. Such a process analysis would provide added protection to the release setting while at the same time preventing the damage to contract doctrine generally that may occur when that doctrine is bent and applied
idiosyncratically to provide special treatment to personal injury releases.

